Entry in the Passenger Rail Industry : A Theoretical Investigation by Ivaldi, Marc et al.
  
 IDEI Report # 2
 
Rail Transport
  
 
 May 2003 
  
 
 
 
Entry in the Passenger Rail Industry
A Theoretical Investigation
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Entry in the Passenger  
Rail Industry: 
A Theoretical Investigation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
IDEI Report #2 on 
Passenger 
Rail Transport 
 
 
 
May 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Entry in the Passenger  
Rail Industry: 
A Theoretical Investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Etienne de Villemeur* 
 
Marc Ivaldi† 
 
Jérôme Pouyet‡ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The authors acknowledge with gratitude the advice and research support of Deutsche Bahn, 
but note that the views expressed remain those of the authors alone and in no way represent 
the official or unofficial views of Deutsche Bahn or its representatives. 
                                                 
* University of Toulouse (GREMAQ and IDEI) 
† University of Toulouse (EHESS and IDEI) 
‡ CERAS-ENPC and IDEI 
Contents
1 Main results 4
2 Introduction 8
2.1 Competition and differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Entry barriers and the incumbent’s behavior faced to the threat of
entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Entry, fixed cost network externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Competition and differentiation 15
3.1 Why is differentiation relevant? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Ways of differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.1 Vertical differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.2 Horizontal differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2.3 Differences and similarities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 A model of entry and vertical differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.1 The monopoly situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3.2 The monopoly situation: An illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.3 The impact of entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.4 The impact of entry: An illustration of the possible scenarios . . . . . 27
3.4.1 First scenario: Incumbent (entrant) on the more (less) prof-
itable segments of the passenger population . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.2 Second scenario: Incumbent (entrant) on the less (more) prof-
itable segments of the passenger population . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5 Impact of competition on profits and welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.5.1 First case: Entrant (incumbent) on the more (less) profitable
segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.5.2 Second case: Entrant (incumbent) on the less (most) prof-
itable segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.4 Intermediate summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6 Extension: Impossibility of effective competition . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6.1 The role of heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6.2 The role of ‘concentration’ and demand elasticity . . . . . . . 37
4 Entry barriers 39
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2 An illustration of entry barriers: Crowding out the product spectrum 40
4.3 Analysis of strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3.1 A simple model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.2 First strategy: Deterrence of entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.3 Second strategy: Accommodation of entry . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.4 Links between the two strategies and discussion . . . . . . . . 43
2
5 Entry, fixed costs and the role of network externalities 44
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.2 Entry and exit in the case of substitutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2.1 The intuition behind the main result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2.3 No entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2.4 Entry on the local market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2.5 Discussion and extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.3 Entry and exit in the case of complements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3.1 Main result and intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3.3 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3.4 No entry: The incumbent has a monopoly position over the
whole network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.3.5 Entry on a local segment: The incumbent withdraws its ser-
vices from the market where entry occurred . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.3.6 Entry on a local segment: The incumbent stays on the market
where entry occurred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.3.7 The strategic advantage of the incumbent created by the com-
plementarities of services on the network . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.3.8 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6 References 59
3
1 Main results
The following results emerge from our analysis.
• Price competition with homogenous services triggers a vigorous price war and
erodes the profits of operators. Therefore, taking entry as given, there exists a
strong incentive for both the incumbent and the entrant to differentiate their
product in order to recover some profits. Differentiation is used strategically
by competitors in order to avoid a fierce price competition.
• There exists different notions of differentiation and therefore different ways for
the operators to differentiate their products. Each notion is related to partic-
ular assumptions on the preferences of the passengers and crucially depends
on the heterogeneity in the passenger population.
• Heterogeneity in the population of passengers is different from market size.
Heterogeneity refers to the variance in the willingness-to-pay for train services
across different types of passengers.1 For instance, business passengers have
a larger valuation for travel time than leisure passengers. The parameter of
differentiation can be used to target specific segments of the population of
(potential) passengers.
• Under monopoly, the incumbent has an incentive to restrict demand in order
to impose a higher price: Excluding the passengers with lower valuations for
train services from the market enables the incumbent to target its offer to the
most profitable passengers (i.e., those with the highest willingness-to-pays).
Since passengers’ willingness-to-pay decreases with travel time, the incumbent
offers a low travel time in order to raise the price of train services. If the cost
of lowering the travel time and/or if passengers are sufficiently sensitive to
travel time reduction, then the monopolist incumbent implements the lowest
travel time consistent with the network constraints.
• Depending on the efficiency gap between the entrant and the incumbent and
on the differentiation opportunities, different entry scenarios are possible.
– If the incumbent anticipates a large differentiation between its product
and the entrant’s offer, then the best strategy for the incumbent depends
on the relative cost efficiency. If the incumbent is not too inefficient com-
pared to entrant, then it should continue to offer a service targeted toward
the most profitable segments (i.e., passengers with high willingness-to-
pays). On the contrary, if the incumbent is much less efficient than the
entrant, then it should target its offer towards a niche market (less prof-
itable segments, lower willingness-to-pays passengers) and let the most
profitable segments to the entrant. This strategy enables the incumbent
to save on its cost.
– By contrast, if the incumbent anticipates that the entrant will not dif-
ferentiate much its product, then it should continue to target the most
1For instance, we can have a small market size with a large heterogeneity in the population.
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profitable segment of higher willingness-to-pay passengers, even if it is
less efficient than the entrant.
– If the entrant is much more efficient than the incumbent, then the incum-
bent should exit the market.
• Entry shortens the incumbent’s market power and increases the variety of
services; this enhances consumers’ surplus. However, if entry cost are non-
negligible, then social welfare might not always be improved with entry. More-
over, if the incumbent benefits from large returns to scale and/or returns to
density, then competition may deteriorate welfare since the erosion of the in-
cumbent’s market share translates into a lower efficiency for this operator.
We deliberately abstract from this effect and refer to the first IDEI report on
Passenger Rail Transport for a thorough analysis of these effects.
• Assume that heterogeneity in the population is small, i.e., that the differences
in willingness-to-pays for train services across passengers are small. 1) There
is only one operator present on the market. Two configurations are possible:
Either the entrant replaces the incumbent, or the entrant does not enter the
market. 2) Which configuration prevails depends on the ability to credibly
commit to target the most profitable segments of passenger population (i.e.,
to offer a sufficiently high frequency level) in order to threaten the competitor
if it attempts to enter/stay active.
• Assume that the demand mainly emanates from potential passengers with
low willingness-to-pays for train transport services and that this demand has
a high price-elasticity (i.e., a small increase of price generates a large fall
in demand). 1) The incumbent with a monopoly position serves the entire
market. 2) It is not possible to have both competitors simultaneously active
on the market because both competitors seek to offer products which are not
sufficiently differentiated (to be close to the demand) and enter in a tough
price competition.
• The withdrawal decision by the incumbent should take into account not only
the direct gains (such as the saving of some part of fixed costs) or direct costs
(such as the loss of the local market where entry occurs) but also the oppor-
tunity cost and gain associated to such a decision. There is an opportunity
loss of staying on the local market and competing head-to-head with the en-
trant since this might force the entrant’s price to be very low, thereby limiting
the pricing decisions of the incumbent on other markets when products are
imperfectly differentiated.
• In a network with a hub-spoke structure the incumbent has a strategic advan-
tage over the potential entrants and may not withdraw from the local market
where entry occurs. Entry is therefore likely to be deterred when potential
entrants do not enjoy a substantial cost advantage over the incumbent and
when the irretrievable entry costs are sufficiently high.
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Indeed, entry on a local market has a positive spillover effect on the connect-
ing markets served by the incumbent when the network exhibits a pattern of
complementarities between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s services, which
arises when the network is a hub-spoke. By staying on the market where en-
try occurred, the incumbent engages in a vigorous price competition (which
also erodes the profit of operators on this market). Since connecting ser-
vices are complements due to the hub-spoke feature of the network, the price
competition increases the demand on the complementary markets. Therefore,
following entry, two cases happen: (i) If the incumbent exits, then the entrant
enjoys a monopoly position on its market and sets a high price on this mar-
ket and on the connecting markets jointly serviced with the incumbent; (ii) If
the incumbent stays on the market where entry has occurred and shares the
connecting markets with the entrant, then it will engage in a price war on the
market where entry occurs. The incumbent prefers the latter strategy to the
former since the smaller price on the market where entry occurs increases the
demand in the connecting and complementary markets in which the incumbent
still enjoys a monopoly position.
Figure 1 summarizes the main results and offers a road map for the analysis
undertaken in this report.
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The incumbent considers the possibility
of entry on a market/region/part of the
network
Does the incumbent offer different
types of substitutable services on this
market?
Yes: heterogeneity in the passenger
population (Section 3)
Are passengers highly sensitive to
price variations?
Yes: Entry is
possible only if the
entrant sufficiently
more efficient than
incumbent; no
competition: entrant
replaces the
incumbent (Section
3.5)
No: Entry possible with
competition between
differentiated operators
(Sections 3.3 & 3.4)
Optimal pre-entry
strategy for the
incumbent? (Section 4)
-Deterrence of entry
-Accommodation of entry
(Sections 4.2 & 4.3)
No: Does the incumbent offer
complementary services on this
market?
Yes: Potential
network effects
No: Competition on
homogenous market
(Sections 2 & 3.5)
Incumbent has a
strategic advantage
over the entrant
Entry is possible only
if entrant sufficiently
more efficient than
incumbent
Can the incumbent
commit credibly to a
pre-entry strategy?
Yes No
Entry is likely
(Section 5.3) 
(Section 5)
Figure 1: Road map of the analysis and main results.
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2 Introduction
This report focusses on two aspects that play a crucial role on the impact and nature
of entry in the railway industry. First, it sheds light on the entry process by taking
into account the opportunity of services differentiation between operators. Second
it deals with the role of externalities provided by the particular structure of railways
network on the possibility of entry.
The first part (Section 3) studies the conditions under which competitors effec-
tively have an incentive to differentiate their services. We argue that differentiation
by a competitor has both a strategic impact on the rival’s price setting behavior and
a direct effect on the demand that this competitor faces. Strategic differentiation
aims at softening the price war between competitors and depends on some condi-
tions on the pattern of demands that prevails on the market in which competition
takes place. The analysis of these issues requires a thorough knowledge of variables
such as travel demand, heterogeneity among the different types of passengers, cost
functions. Indeed, any meaningful analysis of entry and differentiation between com-
petitors in the passenger transport services is dependent on the pattern of demands
that prevails on the network.
Section 4 discusses the case of an incumbent in an asymmetric position vis-a`-
vis a potential competitor when competition is still at an infant stage as in the
railway industry today. In order to prevent entry, the incumbent must commit in
a credible way to an intense price competition in the event of entry. The strategic
interaction between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s decision variables is studied,
as well as the link between the incumbent’s possible strategies, i.e., adaptation to
or prevention of entry.
Section 5 focusses on the effects created by the structure of a railway network.
We develop a simple model that accounts for such network externalities and study
the impact of entry in that framework. Once again, we show that the analysis of
entry depends on the pattern of demands. We also consider the role of credible
commitments by the incumbent. For instance, in absence of high exit costs, this
credibility depends on the interaction between the different services offered by the
incumbent. If a multiproduct incumbent offers substitutable services to passengers,
we show that it has more incentive to withdraw from the market when entry oc-
curred than the entrant; by contrast, when the incumbent and the entrant offer
complementary services, which typically occurs when the incumbent operates a net-
work with a hub-spoke structure, then we argue that the incumbent has an incentive
to stay on the market where entry occurred. Therefore, entry is more likely to be
successful in the former case than in the latter one.
As there is no single and simple answers to the complex question of entry in the
railway industry, the theoretical discussion must be completed with an empirical
approach. Indeed, it is required to assess the sets of parameters that trigger the
different answers.
This work sheds light on some issues of entry in the railway industry. It differs
drastically from Preston, Whelan and Wardman (1998). They analyze the impact
of entry in a very simple network consisting of eight different towns in line. Their
methodology can be exposed as follows. First, they estimate a demand system
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with a nested logit model; second, they estimate a cost model; third, they offer
different scenarios related to entry. In this approach, the strategies of the different
operators are not endogenous. They are postulated by the analysts although it
should be noted that they look at a large number of different scenarios. Then what
might be optimal for a certain demand system might no longer be optimal when
the focus is on another part of the network with probably different demands and
products. Therefore, a more theoretical analysis is also warranted as it should enable
to understand the different effects at work.
We finally emphasize that we do not take explicitly into account the universal
service obligations that must be satisfied by the incumbent operator. An ad hoc
way to account for these constraints is to consider that they translate into higher
costs for the incumbent with respect to the entrant.
Now, we briefly overview the report.
2.1 Competition and differentiation
We first highlight the role of product differentiation in the competition process. In a
broad sense, differentiation arises when passengers have different valuations/willingness-
to-pays for the service offered by an operator. However, there exists different ways
of differentiation, and therefore different ways for the operators to differentiate their
products. Each way involves particular assumptions on the preferences of passen-
gers. For the sake of illustration, we will consider passengers which have different
valuations or willingness-to-pays for transport services stemming from differences
in their value of time. However, the analysis can be applied to any possible ways
of differentiation like comfort, in-board services, flexibility in changing tickets or
electronic ticketing. Summing up, differentiation means that the entrant and the
incumbent target different segments of the passenger population with their differ-
ent products. The important point to notice is that the decision related to the
differentiation of services affects the pricing decisions.
Were the products of the different competitors not differentiated, price competi-
tion would trigger a vigorous price war and would erode the profits of the operators.
Therefore, there exists a potentially strong incentive for both incumbents and en-
trants to differentiate their products in order to recover profits.2 Differentiation is
used strategically by the competitors to avoid an intense price competition: This
is the strategic effect of differentiation in a competitive environment. However, a
competitor must also consider the impact on its demand when it decides the differ-
entiation level of its product: This is the direct effect.
The possibility and the incentive for competitors to differentiate their services
depend on the heterogeneity in the passenger population. Heterogeneity traduces
the degree of differences in the willingness-to-pay for train services across different
types of passengers. For instance, business passengers have larger valuations for
travel time (or for comfort, flexibility or frequency) than leisure passengers. The
2Bonanno (1986) et Gal-Or (1983) study vertical differentiation under Cournot (i.e. quantity)
competition (which is typically ‘less intense’ than price competition), and show that the competi-
tors’ incentives to differentiate their services are still strong.
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scope of this difference measures the heterogeneity in the passenger population.3
Note that heterogeneity differs from the notion of market size.
First, we study the situation in which the incumbent has a monopoly situation on
a given market. The monopoly has an incentive to ration demand in order to be able
to impose a higher price on the residual demand. Excluding from the market the
passengers with lower valuations for train services enables the incumbent to target its
offer on the more profitable passengers (i.e., those with higher willingness-to-pays).
Since passengers’ willingness-to-pay decreases with travel time, the incumbent offers
a low travel time/high speed in order to raise the price of train transportation
services. The level of differentiation chosen by the monopolist incumbent simply
obeys a ‘marginal cost equals marginal benefit’ rule.
Second, we consider the competition between the incumbent and the entrant.
Note that entry is taken for granted. The entrant and the incumbent are treated
symmetrically.
To begin with, note that it is typically the case that introducing competition
enhances the demand for transport services: passengers with lower willingness-to-
pay for transport services and who were not travelling by train under monopoly are
no longer rationed and decide to travel by train.
The choice of differentiation depends now on the strategic interaction, i.e., on
the way the incumbent’s differentiation parameter (travel time) affects the entrant’s
pricing decision, and vice-versa since both competitors are treated symmetrically.
The strategic interaction depends on characteristics of the demand function, in par-
ticular, the distribution of heterogeneity in the population. In our model, prices
will be strategic complements, implying that each competitor has an incentive to
differentiate its service in order to trigger a price increase from its rival, i.e., in order
to soften the price competition.
Competition leads the industry to different equilibrium configurations: Either
the incumbent still targets the segment of passengers with higher willingness-to-
pay and the entrant focuses on the segment of passengers with lower valuations, or
the incumbent switches to the low valuation segments and the entrant ‘skims the
cream’. Which configuration prevails typically depends on the discrepancy between
the incumbent and the entrant in terms of efficiency.
If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the former can credibly
threaten the latter to undertake a price war, which would be unprofitable for the
incumbent if it remains on the high valuation segments of the passenger population.
In that scenario, the entrant picks the cherries and the incumbent finds it more
profitable to service the low valuation segments than to enter into a fierce price
war.4 When the efficiency gap is sufficiently large, the incumbent might exit the
market. This is not because the demand on the market under consideration is
too small; rather the efficient entrant attracts almost all the different segments of
the passenger population because its price is relatively low, even if differentiation
between operators is important.
3This statement will be made clearer later on.
4More precisely, if the incumbent stays on the high valuation segments, then the efficient entrant
would put a strong competitive pressure on the incumbent; therefore, the latter prefers to target
the low valuation segments.
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When the discrepancy in efficiency is not too large, two scenarios become si-
multaneously possible: One operator services the most profitable segments of the
population while the other operator targets the less profitable ones. Indeed, since (i)
competitors have an incentive to differentiate their products in order to soften the
price competition and (ii) they are both attracted by the more profitable segments
of the passenger population, multiple industry configurations become possible. This
suggests a ‘race-to-be-the-first’ between competitors in order to target the most prof-
itable segments of the population. This also suggests that the industry configuration
is likely to be changing repeatedly over time.
We show that if the heterogeneity in the population is small, i.e., the differences
in willingness-to-pay for train services across passengers are small, then
• There will be only one operator present on the market. Two configurations
are then possible: Either the entrant replaces the incumbent, or the entrant
does not enter the market.
• Which configuration prevails depends on the capacity to credibly commit to
target the most profitable segments of the passenger population (i.e., to offer
a sufficiently high frequency level) in order to threaten the competitor. If, for
instance, the incumbent has committed credibly to target the most profitable
segments of the population, then the incentive to differentiate its services leads
the entrant to target the less profitable segments.
Finally, we emphasize that heterogeneity is different from market size. If the
size of the market is sufficiently small so that on-the-track competition is not viable
per se, obviously the entrant is not willing to enter the market. Weak or small
heterogeneity means that there is not enough variance or scope in the passenger
willingness-to-pay for the competitors to differentiate sufficiently and to escape from
an intense price competition.
When demand emanates mainly from potential passengers with a low willingness-
to-pay for train transport services and has a high price-elasticity (i.e., a small in-
crease of price generates a large fall in demand), the incumbent with a monopoly
position serves the entire market. In this case, there is not enough space in terms
of product differentiation to accommodate two competitors. Either the incumbent
exits the market or the entrant replaces the incumbent.
Considering that entry is costly and that it takes time for the entrant to build
a reputation, entry is more likely to occur only in markets characterized by (i) a
sufficiently large degree of heterogeneity in the passenger population allowing both
the entrant and the incumbent to offer differentiated services and (ii) a sufficiently
low price elasticity of the demand in order that each competitor benefits from a non
negligible market power.
2.2 Entry barriers and the incumbent’s behavior faced to
the threat of entry
So far, the focus was on the competition between an incumbent operator and a com-
petitor, which successfully enters the market. This analysis aimed at understanding
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the different aspects of competition through price and non-price variables, and to
identify the conditions under which competition is not viable. One assumption was
to treat the different operators symmetrically: The incumbent affects as much the
competitor’s decisions as does the competitor’s decisions impact on the incumbent’s
different choices.
However, since competition in the railway industry has not yet developed or re-
mains at an early stage, it becomes natural to treat the incumbent and the potential
entrant asymmetrically: The incumbent can undertake actions today that will affect
competition tomorrow.
With the previous framework in mind, assume that now the potential competitor
has not yet entered the market and must decide whether or not to compete with
the incumbent on that market. What is the optimal strategy for the incumbent
operator facing the threat of entry by a potential competitor? Differently stated,
what kind of actions can the incumbent undertake today in order to accommodate
or to prevent entry tomorrow?
In order to deter entry, the incumbent needs to credibly commit to enter in an
intense price competition if entry occurs. For instance, crowding out the spectrum
of services, i.e., producing more than one service when passengers are sufficiently
heterogenous, reduces the opportunity for the entrant to earn positive profits if it
enters the market. Indeed, in that event, the potential competitor anticipates that
it will face more substitutable services to compete with. If the incumbent offers a
sufficiently large number of different services on the same market, then entry will
be deterred. However, such a strategy might be too costly to undertake, in which
case the incumbent prefers to adapt to entry. Its optimal strategy is then aimed at
softening the price competition that will take place on the market once entry has
occurred. The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the strategic interaction.
Summing up, by producing different substitutable services, the incumbent com-
mits to behave aggressively in the event of entry. However, it is crucial that this
commitment be credible as we explain in the last section.
2.3 Entry, fixed cost network externalities
We relax now the assumption of credible commitments. More precisely, we assume
that, after entry has taken place, the incumbent can decide to interrupt one of its
services if it finds it profitable to do so. The novelty here is to account for the network
structure of railways and the externalities created by the network architecture. This
allows us to consider another asymmetry between the incumbent operator and the
potential competitors: The incumbent operates the whole network whereas potential
entrants are likely to enter only on some segments of this network.
To illustrate, consider first a case in which (i) there is one market with het-
erogenous passengers and (ii) the incumbent decides, prior to the entry decision
by a potential competitor, to produce two services, one targeted toward the low-
profitability segments, the other targeted toward the high-profitability segments.
The incumbent is therefore a multi-product operator which offers imperfectly dif-
ferentiated and substitutable services. If entry occurs on the (sub-)market of one of
the services offered by the incumbent, then the entrant and the incumbent engage
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in an intense price competition which results in zero profits for both operators (on
the segment targeted both by the entrant and the incumbent).
Should the potential competitor decide to enter the market? The answer is pos-
itive, since it anticipates that the incumbent will withdraw from the segment where
entry occurred, transforming the industry into a differentiated duopoly. The argu-
ment goes as follows. Assuming that exit costs are not too large, the incumbent’s
commitment to stay on both segments in order to deter entry is not credible. Stated
differently, the multi-product incumbent has more incentive to withdraw from the
segment where entry occurred than the potential competitor. Indeed, if the incum-
bent stays on both sub-markets, then the entrant is indifferent between staying and
exiting since profits are driven down to zero by the price competition on that sub-
market. If the incumbent stays on the sub-market, it has no direct benefit since it
looses the profits on the sub-market where entry occurred. In addition, it entails an
opportunity cost due to the price war with the entrant that depreciates the demand
prevailing on the sub-market serviced by the incumbent since products are demand
substitutes. Therefore, the incumbent has more incentive to exit than the entrant
since this would increase the price on the segment where entry occurred, thereby in-
creasing the demand that the incumbent faces in the other substitutable sub-market.
Anticipating this, the potential entrant decides to enter, thereby triggering the exit
of the incumbent on that segment. More generally, if the incumbent cannot commit
credibly not to exit, crowding out the product spectrum might not always succeed
in deterring entry.
Therefore, when considering the entry decision by a potential competitor, the
incumbent must account not only for the direct costs associated to entry (i.e., the
loss of profit in the market where entry has occurred) but also the opportunity
costs/benefits associated to entry (i.e., the fall in demand for the substitutable
services). These costs/benefits determine the entrant’s incentive to enter or not on
a given market.
Consider now the following setting. An incumbent operates a three-node net-
work, the nodes being denoted by A, B and C. There is a demand for transport
services from A to C, A to B and B to C. The incumbent offers a service between
each city pair. In order to be viable, it must be the case that passengers from A to
C prefer a direct (non stop) trip than an indirect travel from A to B and then from
B to C. The incumbent must therefore satisfies an arbitrage condition: The price
of the AC trip must not be higher than the sum of the price to travel from A to B
and then from B to C.5 We study the possibility of entry in the local AB-market
by a competitor.
In this context, entry involves again a direct cost and an opportunity cost sup-
ported by the incumbent. The direct cost is the loss of profit on the AB-market:
Price competition erodes the profit of both operators. The opportunity cost stems
from the fact that the decrease in the AB-price tends to harden the arbitrage con-
straint for the incumbent. This constraint creates an interaction between the pricing
5One could add an additional cost of waiting time between trains for the AC-passengers without
affecting our results. The mere fact that the incumbent operates a whole network puts constraints
on its pricing decisions which create links between the different markets of services operated by
the incumbent.
13
decisions of the incumbent and generates an additional opportunity cost associated
to entry. In that case, the incumbent has an incentive to withdraw from the market
where entry occurred in order to soften the distortions on the related markets.
Is this opportunity cost always negative? The answer is negative, as we now
illustrate. In order to capture the idea of a hub-spoke network, we consider a
variation of the three-nodes network studied previously. To go from one point to
another, the incumbent operator goes through a hub city. In this framework, we
consider the impact of entry on the local market AB by a competitor and we identify
some conditions under which such an entry is unlikely.
One obvious explanation for the barrier to entry is that interlining is costly.
Passengers may incur time costs for switching between train in the hub-station;
companies may experience coordination costs in arranging schedules and joint fares
for connecting passengers. The explanation we offer enhances other effects of entry.
We show that, even if interlining is costless, network externalities make it difficult
for an entrant to survive.
To understand the effect of entry on the profitability of the operators, two ele-
ments are important
• Transport services on the same link/market are (perfectly) substitutable ser-
vices. The entry of an operator on one link clearly decreases the profitability
of this market for the incumbent.
• Transport services on different (but connected) links are complementary goods.
Therefore, an increased competition on one link increases the demand on the
connected markets, even if these services are not offered by other companies
than the incumbent.
If a competitor enters on one link and the incumbent does not concede the
market, competition between the two operators will lower the price on that market.
The incumbent suffers losses in this market that it can partially offset by adjusting
its prices on the complementary services (i.e., on the connecting markets). When
the size of the network is large enough and more precisely, when the induced traffic
is sufficiently high, the incumbent’s optimal response to entry on one link is not
to withdraw its service on that link. As a result, if we assume that competition
on only one link cannot be profitable and that the competitor is as efficient as the
incumbent, then the competitor is forced to exit and entry is deterred. If the entrant
is sufficiently more efficient than the incumbent, then entry on a local market may
still occur. However, the market share of the entrant is likely to remain small
since the incumbent will be willing to engage in an intense price competition to
benefit from the positive spillovers over the rest of the network. The logic of this
argument is similar to the one developed in the case of an incumbent producing
multiple substitutable services. The difference is that with complementary services,
the opportunity cost of entry is now an opportunity gain for the incumbent since
competition in a local market spreads out in the connecting market. Moreover,
we argue that different industry configurations following entry are possible: One in
which the incumbent shares the connecting markets with the entrant, the other in
which the incumbent does not share the market. Another implication is that entry
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is more likely to occur ‘on-the-rim’, that is, on a new line so that it does not directly
compete with the incumbent.
3 Competition and differentiation
Before presenting a theoretical analysis of oligopolistic competition under differen-
tiation, we discuss first the meaning and the role of product differentiation.
3.1 Why is differentiation relevant?
Consider the simplest setting in which an incumbent and an entrant compete in
price on a given point-to-point transport service. Assume that passengers have no
other possibilities than to demand the point-to-point service to this incumbent or
this entrant (i.e., there are no substitutes for train transportation).
To understand the role of differentiation, consider first that competitors offer a
perfectly homogenous good: All attributes of the services offered by the incumbent
and the entrant are identical (travel time, frequency, comfort/on-board services).
From the passengers’ point of view the product of the entrant is perfectly identical
to the product offered by the incumbent.
Let pi and pe be respectively the price offered by the incumbent and the entrant
for this travel. Let D(pi, pe) be the total demand associated to these prices. To
further simplify the analysis, we assume that both competitors have no fixed costs
and identical constant marginal costs of production.
What is the outcome? In such a situation, price competition between competitors
offering a perfectly homogenous good/service leads to zero profit at equilibrium.
Indeed, consider that the incumbent proposes a price pi greater than the price pe
offered by the entrant; in this case the entrant has the entire demand6: Di(pi, pe) =
0 and De(pi, pe) = D(pi, pe). The incumbent earns zero profit while the entrant
has a monopoly position over the entire demand. Then, the incumbent would be
better off lowering its price slightly below the entrant’s price. As the entrant makes
simultaneously a similar reasoning and would then have an incentive to undercut
the incumbent’s price, the process leads through progressive adjustments to a price
war which erodes the profits of both competitors. At equilibrium, prices are such
that both competitors price at marginal cost and share equally the demand. Thus,
neither the incumbent nor the entrant make strictly positive profits.7
The reason is that, with an homogenous product, each competitor has a strong
incentive to undercut the price of its rival, since it is anticipated that such a price
reduction will enable to attract all the demand for transport services.
The analysis remains qualitatively unchanged when operators have positive and
identical costs, whatever the cost structures. At equilibrium, prices are then equal
to average costs and operators make no profits. If costs are different, then the lowest
cost operator offers a price equal to the average cost of the highest cost operator and
6A subscript k indicates that we refer to operator k.
7In this simple framework, such a situation, in which operators price at their marginal cost,
would also be socially optimal. This is no longer the case when marginal costs are constant but
different or when Bertrand competition leads to average cost pricing at equilibrium (see below).
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earns some profits; the highest cost operator earns no profit since it cannot offer a
price smaller than its rival as its marginal cost is higher.
The picture would be different if the entrant’s product is differentiated from the
incumbent’s product. In this case, some passengers would intrinsically value more
the entrant’s product while other passengers would have a larger valuation for the
incumbent’s product8. As opposed to the perfectly homogenous products case, if
the entrant decreases its price slightly below the incumbent’s price for instance, then
this would not lead anymore to a drastic shift of demand: Only a fraction (which,
of course, depends on the price gap) of total demand would be captured by the
entrant. To a certain extent, differentiation will enable the operators to escape from
an intense price competition and to earn positive profits at equilibrium.9
Summary 1: Price competition with homogenous services trig-
gers a vigorous price war and erodes the profits of operators.
There exists a strong incentive for both the incumbent and the
entrant to differentiate their product in order to recover some
profits. Differentiation is used strategically by competitors in
order to avoid a fierce price competition.
While the previous reasoning is immediate, many issues remain to be understood.
In particular, the following questions are critical: What factors do influence the
way operators differentiate their products/services? What is the outcome of the
competitive game with endogenous product differentiation?
3.2 Ways of differentiation
First, we recall the economic definitions of differentiation. There are two types of
differentiation that we illustrate now with the following situation: An incumbent
operator I acts as a monopoly and produces a transport service which is then sold
to a population of passengers.
3.2.1 Vertical differentiation
At an abstract level, vertical differentiation arises when passengers agree on the
ranking of preferences.10 For instance, all passengers prefer fast than slow trains.
However, passengers may have different valuations11 for the product offered by the
8This statement is vague. Even though some passengers may value more one service than the
other, this depends also on the difference between the prices of the incumbent’s product and the
entrant’s service as we explain later on.
9Price competition is the most extreme form of competition. For instance, quantity (i.e.,
Cournot) or capacity competition is usually less intense.
10See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980), Shaked and Sutton (1982).
11The terms ‘valuation’ and ‘willingness-to-pay’ define the maximal price that a given passenger
is willing to pay for the service offered by an operator; this price depends on the characteristics of
that service.
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incumbent or different willingness-to-pay for the incumbent’s product. These dif-
ferences in valuations may come from differences in the value of time: Business
passengers usually have higher valuations for the time spent on travelling than
leisure passengers. These differences may also come from differences in valuations
of alternative options: Some passengers may be more willing to substitute train
transportation to another transport mode than other passengers.
Another instance of vertical differentiation concerns flexibility: Some passen-
gers are more willing to benefit from flexibility (i.e., to be allowed to change their
ticket for another train), while other passengers may prefer a lower price associated
restricted possibilities to change their ticket once bought. Finally comfort or on-
board services might also be valued differently by different segments of passengers.
The simplest way to model such a situation goes as follows. Consider passengers
who decide to travel from point A to point B either by train or by car (or any
alternative transport mode). If they travel by car, they earn an exogenous utility
level that we normalize to 0. If they travel by train, then the utility level they get
depends on the attributes of the service offered by the train operator. Assume for
the sake of simplicity that the only relevant attribute is the time length T of the
trip from A to B. The utility of passengers is given by
U =
{
θν(T )− p if they travel by train,
0 otherwise.
Parameter θ describes the heterogeneity in the population of passengers: Some of
them have a higher utility derived from the train service with travel time T than
others. The function ν(T ) expresses how passengers derive utility from a train
service with attribute/travel-time T .12
In that framework, the operator chooses both the travel time T and the as-
sociated price p. Given the constraints inherited from the physical network, it is
reasonable to assume that only a restricted set of travel times can be implemented
by the train operator, i.e., T ∈ [T , T ]. In other words, for the trips considered, it
is not possible to offer a travel time smaller than T and larger than T because, for
instance, it would affect the other services offered on the whole network. Note that
these constraints on the set of travel time values that can be implemented limit the
set of services that can be offered by the incumbent.
When we consider oligopolistic competition later on, it is reasonable to assume
that both operators face those constraints. By contrast, the choice of a travel time
may have distinct impacts on the competitors depending on their ‘production tech-
nology’ (i.e., their cost function).
12For instance, the smaller the travel time is, the higher is the utility derived by passengers.
However, for a given θ, the marginal utility with respect to time might be decreasing, because
passengers might value more a reduction of the travel time when the travel time is initially high
than when it is low.
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3.2.2 Horizontal differentiation
Horizontal differentiation arises when the choice made by passengers for identical
prices of the services offered by the operator depends on the passengers.13 Suppose
that the incumbent faces an heterogenous population of passengers. Now, each
passenger would like to buy an ‘ideal product’.14 As an example, consider the case
of two distinct populations of passengers: business and leisure passengers. Assume
that business passengers prefer travelling early in the morning and going back in
the evening, whereas leisure passengers are more indifferent on the departure and
return time.
Passengers are distributed on the segment [0, 1]. A passenger located in x ∈ [0, 1]
has the following utility
U =
{
s− α(x− a)2 − p if it travels by train
0 otherwise.
Parameter s is the gross utility of of a trip from A to B by train. Parameter a
describes the location of service (i.e., its attributes) offered by the train operator in
the product space. To fix ideas, it might be a particular time slot for the AB-trip.
Then, the value α(x − a)2 gives the disutility for the passenger located in x to use
the train operator’s particular service that differs from the ‘ideal’ service that this
passenger would like to buy. For instance, some passengers would like to arrive at
point B at 11:00 AM whereas others would prefer to arrive at 12:00 AM. If the
incumbent offers a service with an arrival time at 11:30 AM it cannot perfectly
coincide with the ‘ideal product’ of these two types of passengers.
As in the vertical differentiation setting, the constraints inherited from the phys-
ical network reduce the spectrum of products that can be offered by the different
operators. This is captured through the assumption that each operator offers only
one product, i.e., each operator is located on a particular point a of the [0, 1] seg-
ment.
3.2.3 Differences and similarities
Under oligopolistic competition, these two ways of product differentiation generally
lead to similar qualitative results. There are however some exceptions that we
describe later on. Note that these two ways involve different assumptions on the
preferences of passengers and therefore on the demand functions.
Summary 2: There exists different notions of differentiation
and therefore different ways for the operators to differentiate
their products. Each notion is related to particular assump-
tions on the preferences of the passengers.
13See Hoteling (1929), D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979).
14In the vertical differentiation case, if two services are offered at the same price, then all pas-
sengers choose the service with the highest quality/lowest travel time.
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3.3 A model of entry and vertical differentiation
Assume that passengers’ gain or utility when they travel from A to B by train with
travel time T is given by U = θν(T )− p and 0 otherwise. The frequency T belongs
to the interval [T , T ].
Parameter θ is the valuation for travel time and takes values in the range [θ, θ].
This reflects the heterogeneity among passengers: Lower valuations for time are
associated to lower willingness-to-pay than for passengers with higher valuations.
The smaller the travel time is, the larger will be the willingness-to-pay for the
service. Roughly speaking, the parameter of differentiation is a variable that enables
the operator(s) to target specific classes or segments of the population of passengers.
We assume that θ is distributed according to a density g(.) and a cumulative
distribution G(.) on the interval [θ, θ]. The distribution of the heterogeneity provides
the weights of different categories of passengers in the population. For instance, a
uniform distribution means that there are the same proportions of the different
types of passengers. If the distribution is decreasing over [θ, θ], there are more
passengers with relatively low valuations for train services than passengers with
relatively high willingness-to-pay. We also assume that the total demand (provided
that all passengers decide to travel by train) is normalized to 1 (without loss of
generality). This is represented in Figure 2.
Distribution concentrated around
Low-profitability segments
Uniform distribution
Willingness-to-pay/
profitability
qq
Figure 2: Different distributions of the heterogeneity in the passenger population.
Note that market size (here equal to 1) is different from heterogeneity, here
measured by ∆θ = θ − θ and the distribution g(.). The market may be large or
small independently of the heterogeneity being low (∆θ ≈ 0) or high (∆θ  0).
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Summary 3: Heterogeneity in the population of passengers is
different from market size. Heterogeneity refers to the vari-
ance in the willingness-to-pay for train services across dif-
ferent types of passengers. For instance, business passengers
have a larger valuation for travel time than leisure passengers.
The parameter of differentiation can be used to target specific
segments of the population of (potential) passengers.
3.3.1 The monopoly situation
In the sequel, the monopoly case serves as a benchmark. The incumbent’s problem is
to find a pair travel time-price which maximizes its profit. For a given pair {Ti, pi},
there exists a passenger with valuation θ˜ who is exactly indifferent between travelling
with the incumbent or not, i.e., U(θ˜) = θ˜ν(Ti) − pi = 0 or θ˜ = pi/ν(Ti). It is the
‘marginal passenger’. The demand for transport services faced by the monopolist is
Di(pi, Ti) = 1 − G(θ˜) where G(θ˜) is the share of potential passengers that do not
travel by train and prefer another transport mode when the monopoly offers the
pair {Ti, pi} and is represented in Figure 3.
Potential passengers
who do not travel
by train
Passengers who
travel by train
q q( )ee tp ,
~
q
Willingness-to-pay/
Profitability of segments
Figure 3: The demand that addresses to the monopoly with vertical
differentiation.
Consider that the incumbent’s cost is given by Ci(Qi, Ti) where Qi is the demand
for transport services, i.e., Qi = Di(pi, Ti).
The incumbent’s problem is written as
max
{Ti,pi}
pii ≡ piDi(pi, Ti)− Ci(Di(pi, Ti), Ti).
The price chosen by the monopolist is such that the marginal revenue equals the
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marginal cost, i.e.,
∂pii
∂pi
= 0⇔ pi∂Di
∂pi
+Di︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Revenue
=
∂Ci
∂Qi
∂Di
∂pi
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Cost
(1)
which can be rewritten as follows
pi − ∂Ci∂Qi
pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative Mark-up
=
1
i
,︸︷︷︸
Inverse of Demand Elasticity
(2)
where i ≡ −∂Di/∂piDi/pi is the demand elasticity.
Equation (1) tells us that an increase in price has two effects. First, it reduces
the demand since the number of passengers willing to travel by train decreases,
i.e., the marginal passenger is changed: ∂θ˜
∂pi
> 0 implies that ∂Di
∂pi
= −g(θ˜) ∂θ˜
∂pi
< 0.
Second, it increases the gain earned on the types that are still willing to travel with
the incumbent operator, i.e., the so-called inframarginal passengers. At equilibrium,
the price chosen by the monopoly is such that the sum of these effects is equal to
the marginal cost of an additional passenger.
Equation (2) tells that the incumbent’s market power, given by the relative
markup imposed on the final price of service, is inversely proportional to the price
elasticity of the demand for transport services. The higher the price elasticity of
the demand is, the smaller is the distortion on the final price created by the market
power of the incumbent. It is an intuitive result since the elasticity provides the
sensitivity of passengers with respect to price, for a given travel time.
As it is illustrated in Figure 4, the pricing decision by the monopoly is socially
inefficient.
Consider now the choice of travel time by the incumbent operator. Simple ma-
nipulations show that the travel time chosen by the incumbent obeys the following
formula
∂pii
∂Ti
= 0⇔
(
pi − ∂Ci
∂Di
)
∂Di
∂Ti
=
∂Ci
∂Ti
. (3)
The incumbent chooses the travel time such that the marginal gain of reducing the
travel time by a small amount in terms of increased demand and revenue is equal
to the marginal cost borne by the incumbent operator to reduce that travel time by
this amount.
Note that from the optimal pricing decision (Equation (1)), the markup of the
final price over the marginal cost is positive, i.e., pi − ∂Ci∂Di > 0. Consequently, if
passengers are sufficiently sensitive to the change in the travel time (i.e., ∂Di
∂Ti
is
sufficiently negative), or if the marginal cost of travel time is sufficiently low (i.e.,
∂Ci
∂Ti
is sufficiently small), then the monopolist incumbent offers the smallest travel
time consistent with the technical constraint
∂pii
∂Ti
=
(
pi − ∂Ci
∂Di
)
∂Di
∂Ti
− ∂Ci
∂Ti
< 0⇔ Ti = T . (4)
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Inverse demand
Marginal revenue
Monopoly
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Socially
optimal
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quantity
Socially
optimal
quantity
Quantity
Figure 4: The pricing and production decisions of the monopoly: Marginal
benefit equals marginal cost.
In this abstract framework, the incumbent operator with a monopoly position
has an incentive to offer a service with high quality (low travel time) in order to
raise passengers’ willingness-to-pay for that service. If the direct cost of doing so is
not too high, then the incumbent will set the smallest possible travel time.
Finally, demand at equilibrium is rationed (i.e., θ˜ > θ). Indeed, by focusing on
passengers with larger valuations, i.e., by rationing of the demand, the incumbent
can impose a higher price on the more profitable segments of the population.15
Summary 4: Under monopoly, the incumbent has an incen-
tive to ration demand in order to impose a higher price on the
residual demand: Excluding the passengers with lower valua-
tions for train services from the market enables the incumbent
to target its offer on the more profitable passengers (i.e., those
with higher willingness-to-pay). Since passengers’ willingness-
to-pay decreases with travel time, the incumbent offers a low
travel time in order to raise the price of train services. If the
cost of lowering the travel time and/or if passengers are suffi-
ciently sensitive to travel time reduction, then the monopolist
incumbent implements the lowest travel time consistent with
the network constraints.
15This depends on characteristics of demand function. We consider later a case in which all
passengers decide to travel by train when the incumbent has a monopoly position.
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3.3.2 The monopoly situation: An illustration
As an illustration of these different points, consider an example based on the follow-
ing assumptions
• Heterogeneity among the population of passengers is uniformly distributed.
Then g(θ) = 1/∆θ and G(θ) = (θ − θ)/∆θ. Roughly speaking, a uniform
heterogeneity means that there is the same proportion of different types of
passengers. We return later on this assumption when we deal with the impos-
sibility of effective competition.
• The cost function of the incumbent operator is given by: Ci(Qi, Ti) ≡ ciQi +
c˜i(Ti). The cost function is assumed to be separable in the volume of passenger-
kilometers and the travel time (the differentiation variable). Indeed, we view
the cost of transporting passenger and adopting a technology that enables to
operate faster on the AB-trip as mainly unrelated. In particular, the decision
to operate a faster train on a segment of the network does not affect the
marginal cot of transporting an additional passenger on that train (if the
capacity constraint of the train is not binding of course).
Equations (1) and (3) become
∂pii
∂pi
= 0⇔ pi = 1
2
[
ci + θν(Ti)
]
, (1′)
∂pii
∂Ti
= 0⇔ (pi − ci) pi
ν(Ti)2
ν ′(Ti)−∆θc˜′i(Ti) = 0. (3′)
We can make the following comments on these equations.
First, the monopolist incumbent’s price will be above its marginal cost ci if the
passengers’ willingness-to-pay is sufficiently large, i.e., θν(Ti) > ci, an assumption
that we keep from now on.
Second, this decision on travel time trades off two effects. The first effect is
the increase in the willingness-to-pay of passengers. The second effect is related
to the increase in cost associated to a marginal reduction of time travel. If the
marginal cost of decreasing travel time is large (i.e., c˜′i(.) strongly negative), then
the monopoly may prefer setting the largest travel time consistent with the network
constraints, i.e., Ti = T . A similar result occurs when passengers are not very
sensitive to a reduction of travel time, i.e., ν ′(Ti) is very small, in which case the
incumbent sets a large travel time. By contrast, when the cost of reducing travel
time is low or when passengers are highly sensitive to a reduction of the travel
time, then the incumbent operator sets the smallest possible travel time consistent
with the network constraints: Ti = T . For intermediate situations, the travel time
implemented by the monopolist lies in between these two extreme values.
Third, demand is rationed, i.e., the market is not entirely covered, when θ˜ > θ or
ci + (θ − 2θ)ν(Ti) > 0. This condition is intuitive: When the marginal cost is high,
reducing the demand saves on cost. More interesting is the role of the ‘spread’ of
passengers’ willingness-to-pay: When heterogeneity in the population of passengers
is large, i.e., when θ−2θ > 0, then the monopoly has an incentive to ration demand
23
in order to be able to impose a higher price on the residual demand (remember that
the set of passengers that travel by train is [θ˜, θ]); by contrast, when the population
of passengers is homogenous, then there is almost no gain to exclude passengers with
lower valuations for train services in order to impose a higher price on passengers
with higher valuations, since the latters’ willingness-to-pay is close to the formers’
willingness-to-pay.
Finally, we emphasize the following point. When the incumbent benefits from a
monopoly position, the ‘quality’ offered, which is represented here by the travel time,
tends to be high, except when that incumbent operator is relatively cost inefficient.
Importantly, the price and travel time are set by simple ‘price equals marginal cost’-
like rules.
3.3.3 The impact of entry
Now consider the impact of entry by a competitor E. Let {pi, Ti} and {pe, Te}
be the price and travel time offered by the incumbent operator and the entrant,
respectively.
To study this oligopolistic competition under quality differentiation, we first
analyze price competition assuming a given travel time per operator. Then, we
determine the choice of travel time by each operator. This timing traduces the fact
that changing prices might be done in a very short period of time, whereas changing
travel time values might involve a longer period of time (planning time). This two-
stage game allows us to understand how competition does affect both the pricing
decisions and the choices of travel time values by the different operators.
Assume for the moment that Ti ≤ Te: The entrant offers a larger travel time
on the AB-trip. Given the different interpretations of the differentiation parame-
ter, the following interpretation also holds. The entrant targets the less profitable
segments of the population (passengers with lower valuations for train services) and
the incumbent targets the most profitable segments of the population. This implies
that prices must be such that pi ≥ pe.
The demand functions. What is the demand faced by each operator? First
consider the passenger with valuation θ˜ who is indifferent between travelling with the
incumbent and the entrant: θ˜ν(Ti)−pi = θ˜ν(Te)−pe or θ˜ = (pi−pe)/(ν(Ti)−ν(Te)).
This is represented in Figure 5.
Note that we could also consider that there exists a (different) threshold θˆ such
that passengers with type θ ≤ θˆ decide not to travel by train. This would put
an additional constraint on the pricing/travel time decisions of the operator which
targets passengers with lower willingness-to-pay. Our analysis can be extended to
account for such a case. We can show that, under fairly weak assumptions, the low
frequency operator has no incentive to ration the demand. Indeed, price competition
already drastically reduces the demand faced by each operator and there would be
no or a small gain for the low frequency operator to further reduce its demand
through rationing. Therefore competition will usually lead to a larger number of
passengers that decide to travel by trains: Competition tends to increase the total
demand for transport services.
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Figure 5: The demand that addresses to the different competitors with vertical
differentiation.
The demand faced by the entrant is now De(pi, pe) = G(θ˜) and the demand faced
by the incumbent is Di(pi, pe) = 1 − G(θ˜). The profits of the two competitors are
given by {
pii = piDi(pi, pe)− Ci(Di(pi, pe), Ti),
pie = peDe(pi, pe)− Ce(De(pi, pe), Te).
Define ∆ν(T ) ≡ ν(Ti)− ν(Te) ≥ 0.
The price competition stage. Consider the incumbent’s choice of price. The
first-order condition associated with pi is
pi
∂Di
∂pi
+Di =
∂Ci
∂Qi
∂Di
∂pi
,
or
pi − ∂Ci∂Qi
∆ν(T )
=
1−G(θ˜)
g(θ˜)
. (5)
The pricing decision is similar to the one under monopoly. The modification is that
the incumbent’s demand is reduced and depends on the pair price-frequency offered
by the entrant (through θ˜).
Similarly, the price chosen by the entrant is given by
pe − ∂Ce∂Qe
∆ν(T )
=
G(θ˜)
g(θ˜)
. (6)
Solving simultaneously (5) and (6) enables to obtain the prices as function of
the frequencies: pe(Ti, Te) and pe(Ti, Te).
When setting its price, a competitor simply maximizes its profit which depends
on the residual demand it faces; this residual demand in turn is a function of the
price set by the competitor and taken as given. Once we account for the ‘modified’
demand function, the pricing policy of the incumbent operator is the same as in
the monopoly situation. The important assumption here is that prices are chosen
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simultaneously by the entrant and the competitor.
The travel time choice stage. Consider now the choice of travel time by the
operators at the first stage of the game. Consider the incumbent. The choice of Ti
has a direct effect on its profit pii via the effect on the demand faced by the incumbent
and on its costs. This choice also affects the setting of price by the entrant at the
second stage of the game through a strategic effect. To understand these effects,
consider the total impact of Ti on pii
d
dTi
pii(pi(Ti, Te), pe(Ti, Te), Ti, Te) =
∂pii
∂Ti︸︷︷︸
Direct effect
+
∂pii
∂pe
dpe
dTi
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic effect
(7)
The direct effect corresponds to the ‘marginal benefit minus marginal cost of travel
time’ effect that was guiding the choice of travel time under monopoly. A decrease
in the travel time Ti has a direct cost, but also comes with a benefit since it expands
the demand faced by the incumbent.
Competition forces the incumbent to account for an additional effect when de-
ciding its differentiation level. This strategic effect corresponds to the impact of
its choice of differentiation level on the competitor’s behavior in the price compe-
tition stage. When the incumbent looses its monopoly position, the setting of the
attributes of the services offered to passengers must account for a new strategic
effect.16
Notice that ∂pii
∂pe
> 0. Indeed, if the entrant’s quality/travel time is fixed, then a
decrease of the entrant’s price tends to erode the demand, and therefore the profit,
of the incumbent operator. Conversely, if the entrant’s final price increases, then
the price competition becomes softer and the incumbent’s profit increases.
Now, direct computations show that17
dpe
dTi
=
∂pe
∂Ti
+
∂pe
∂pi
∂pi
∂Ti
∝ −H(θ˜)ν ′(Ti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+∆ν(T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
H ′(θ˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
∂θ˜
∂Ti︸︷︷︸
≤0
,
where H = 1−G
g
. Notice that H ′ = (1−G)(1−G)
′′−[(1−G)′]2
[(1−G)′]2 . The sign of H
′ depends
on the log-concavity/convexity of 1−G(θ). Hence the nature of the strategic effect
strongly depends on the distribution of the heterogeneity among passengers. We
come back on this point later on.
Note that this point is more general than it may appear at a first sight. In
oligopolistic models of competition, the strategic interaction between the competi-
tors’ decision variables depends on the characteristics of the demand functions. In
our case, it depends on the curvature (i.e., the second derivative) of the measure of
the heterogeneity given by H(.). This strategic interaction is fundamental to de-
16Since the incumbent and the entrant are treated symmetrically, the same considerations hold
for the entrant.
17We assume that ∂
2Ce
∂Q2e
> 0, which is sufficient for the entrant’s maximization problem to have
an interior solution. This does not drastically affect the main points of this analysis.
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termine how competitors will differentiate their services in order to soften the price
competition at the subsequent stage of the game.
Indeed, it might be the case that dpe
dTi
≥ 0, in which case the incumbent has an
incentive to increase the travel time of its service for strategic purpose, i.e., to ensure
that the price competition with the entrant will not be too intense. By contrast,
when dpe
dTi
≤ 0 then the incumbent has an incentive to reduce the travel time of its
service in order to soften the entrant’s behavior.
The important point to note is that the precise way to soften the entrant’s be-
havior at the price competition stage is dictated by the distribution of heterogeneity,
i.e., by the characteristics of the demand function.
3.4 The impact of entry: An illustration of the possible
scenarios
To illustrate the impact of entry, we return to the example that we introduced
previously.
We modify specification of the cost function by assuming that the cost of the
travel time consists only of a fixed cost: c˜k(Tk) = FTk . Differently stated, imple-
menting a shorter AB-trip involves only a fixed cost. The shorter the time travel
is, the larger is the fixed cost. Since travel time belongs to the interval [T , T ], the
fixed cost belongs to [FT ≡ F, FT ≡ F ].
We emphasize that similar qualitative results would be achieved with different
specifications of the cost functions. The basic message that is conveyed by this
analysis is that the entry scenarios might not be unique and that differentiation
(in a broad sense) enables to soften the price competition between the incumbent
and the entrant under certain conditions. In our case, it is typically the case that
differentiation is maximal. With different cost specifications, a significant amount
of differentiation between operators would occur in order to soften the price compe-
tition game.
3.4.1 First scenario: Incumbent (entrant) on the more (less) profitable
segments of the passenger population
Solving the price competition stage leads to the following expressions{
pi(Ti, Te) =
1
3
[
2ci + ce + (2θ − θ)∆ν(T )
]
,
pe(Ti, Te) =
1
3
[
2ce + ci + (θ − 2θ)∆ν(T )
]
.
It is then immediate to compute the incumbent’s and the entrant’s profit from the
viewpoint of the first stage of the game. Then, simple manipulations show that the
operators will differentiate as much as possible their services by setting Ti = T and
Te = T since
dpi
dTe
> 0 and dpe
dTi
< 0. Profits are then given by{
pii =
[
pi(T , T )− ci
]
Di(pi(T , T ), pe(T , T ), T , T )− F ,
pie =
[
pe(T , T )− ce
]
De(pi(T , T ), pe(T , T ), T , T )− F.
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Sufficiently high
travel time differential
Sufficiently low
travel time differential
Variation of
incumbent’s
profit
picompetitioni ≥ pimonopolyi picompetitioni ≤ pimonopolyi
Table 1: Incumbent’s profit under monopoly and competition when the entrant
targets the less profitable segments.
To further simplify the analysis, we assume from now on that ci = ce = 0.
Impact of competition on the incumbent’s profit. With respect to the
monopoly situation, since the incumbent sticks to the lowest travel time, it has
the same total cost under monopoly and under competition. Therefore, the varia-
tion of the incumbent’s profit only depends on the travel time differential, as shown
in Table 3.
The intuition is the following. Under monopoly, the incumbent can only offer
a limited number of services, that we set equal to 1: The monopolist incumbent
rations the demand in order to increase revenue earned from the residual demand
(i.e., the passengers who effectively travel with the incumbent operator). In this
competitive scenario, competitors seek to differentiate as much as possible their
services in order to soften the price competition. The entrant then targets the low
profitability segments of passengers and might benefit from a low market share if it is
relatively inefficient. The entrant’s offer (price and travel time) now defines in part
the demand that addresses to the incumbent which targets the higher profitability
segments. Therefore, the demand that addresses to the incumbent might be larger
than under monopoly in particular when services are sufficiently differentiated.
To fix ideas, consider that the marginal production costs of both competitors
are zero: ci = ce = 0. Then, the demand that the monopolist incumbent faces is
equal to θ
2
; in this competitive scenario, its demand becomes equal to θ+θ
3
, which
is larger than the demand under monopoly when the heterogeneity is sufficiently
large.18 With entry, when the travel time differential is very large, i.e., when the
differentiation between operators is very large, the entrant does not put a strong
competitive pressure on the incumbent and only deals with a limited fraction of
the market with low profitability levels; the incumbent has no longer to ration
the demand to increase passengers’ willingness-to-pay and fully exercises its market
power on the large part of the market that addresses to it.
However, the entry of a new competitor also triggers a price competition, whose
18Rigorously, we need to check that the entrant has no incentive to ration the demand, a require-
ment which puts an additional constraint on the travel time values. Simple computations show
that in our example it is always possible to find a pair of travel time values {T , T} such that the
entrant does not ration the demand and the incumbent’s demand increases.
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intensiveness depends on the differentiation between products. If the differentiation
between the products offered by the entrant and the incumbent is too low, then
a vigorous price competition destroys the benefit created by the increase in total
demand, leading to a smaller profit for the incumbent in that entry scenario than
under monopoly.
3.4.2 Second scenario: Incumbent (entrant) on the less (more) prof-
itable segments of the passenger population
In this case, the roles of the entrant and the incumbent are reversed. Computations
are immediately adapted from the analysis of the preceding scenario.
The interesting situation arises in the case of a high fixed cost of travel time and
a large travel time differential. A high fixed cost means that the incumbent’s profit
under monopoly is relatively low. Moreover, remember that under monopoly the
incumbent offers the lowest travel time.
With that competitive scenario, the entrant ‘replaces’ the incumbent as it offers
low travel time trains while the incumbent now offers high travel time trains. When
the travel time differential is large enough, this means that price competition is not
too intense and that the incumbent still benefits from a sufficiently large demand;
simultaneously, the incumbent is now able to drastically reduce its cost since it
offers the highest travel time. In that case, the introduction of competition does not
reduce the incumbent’s profit. When the differential in travel time is rather small,
however, the incumbent’s profit decreases after the entry of a competitor because the
most profitable segments of the population of passengers adopt the entrant and/or
because price competition is intense.
This result has a broader interpretation. When the incumbent adapts to entry,
then it is sometimes profitable to let the entrant target the most profitable segments
of the population of passengers. Indeed, those segments require to set a high level
of ‘quality’ (frequency, comfort, speed...) and therefore generate a high cost. If the
differentiation between competitors is sufficiently large so that price competition is
not too intense, then the incumbent prefers to focus on the low profitability segments
to reduce its costs.
3.4.3 Discussion
Which scenario is likely to occur? We can only partially reply to this question.
First, based on our most simple example (no cost associated to the volume
of passenger-kms, separable costs, identical cost functions, uniform heterogeneity)
assume that there are no fixed costs associated with different travel time values.
These are strong assumptions. However, an interesting result arises in that case: the
two entry scenarios are simultaneously possible. Differently stated, the equilibrium
of the game is not unique since both operators have the incentive to target the most
profitable segments of the population of passengers and there is no cost associated
to a decrease in the travel time.
Therefore, when the difference between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s effi-
ciency is rather small, a ‘race-to-be-the-first’ is likely to emerge in order to target the
most profitable segments of the population. This case yields an unstable industry
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configuration over the time: The competitor dealing with the less profitable segments
is likely to try repeatedly to attack the operator dealing with the more profitable
segments in the hope of switching from one industry equilibrium to another.19
Second, what does happen when one competitor is much more efficient than
the other? In this case, the efficient competitor can credibly commit to target the
most profitable segments of passengers. Indeed, if the efficient operator was serving
segments of low profitability, then it would put too strong a pressure on the other
competitor; a limit case arise when the most efficient operator’s price is so low
(despite product differentiation) that the least efficient operator is forced to exit
the market. However, when the efficiency differential is not too large, then it might
be possible for the least efficient operator to target the most profitable segments
of the population of passengers since both competitors have a strong incentive to
differentiate their services.
Third, when the differentiation between services is low, then both competitors
anticipate an intense price war. The operator which targets the higher-valuations
segments is likely to earn a larger profit than the other operator.
19This implicitly assumes that the profit of serving the higher valuations segments is larger than
the profit associated to the service of the lower valuations segments, which is the case when the
difference between the costs associated to a low travel time and a high travel time is not too large.
Otherwise, it suffices to change the labelling of the different segments.
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Summary 5: The incumbent has a privileged position in the
industry in the sense that when multiple industry configura-
tions following entry are possible, the incumbent can influence
the realized configuration.
If the incumbent anticipates a large differentiation between its
product and the entrant’s offer, then the best strategy for the
incumbent depends on the relative cost efficiency. If the in-
cumbent is not too inefficient compared to entrant, then it
should continue to offer a service targeted toward the most
profitable segments (i.e., passengers with high willingness-to-
pay). On the contrary, if the incumbent is much less efficient
than the entrant, then it should target its offer towards a niche
market (less profitable segments, lower willingness-to-pay pas-
sengers) and let the most profitable segments to the entrant.
This strategy enables the incumbent to save on its cost.
By contrast, if the incumbent anticipates that the entrant will
not differentiate much its product, then it should continue to
target the most profitable segment of higher willingness-to-pay
passengers, even if it is less efficient than the entrant.
If the entrant is much more efficient than the incumbent, then
the incumbent should exit the market.
3.5 Impact of competition on profits and welfare
We consider that the distribution of heterogeneity is uniformly distributed on its
support. We also assume that the entrant’s cost of travel time is equal to zero. To
further simplify the analysis we assume (without loss of generality) that θ = 1 and
θ = 5. In order to obtain simple analytical expressions, we assume that ν(T ) = 1/T
and ci(T ) = 1/TFi for all T > 0, where ci(T ) is the incumbent’s cost of implementing
a trip with travel time equal to T .
3.5.1 First case: Entrant (incumbent) on the more (less) profitable seg-
ments
The monopoly benchmark. Let θ˜m = pmi T
m
i be the marginal passenger. The
demand faced by the incumbent is given by Di(p
m
i , T
m
i ) =
1
∆θ
(θ − θ˜m). The profit
of the incumbent under monopoly is given by pimi (p
m
i , T
m
i ) = D
m
i p
m
i − FTmi .
Optimization with respect to price yields
pmi (T
m
i ) =
1
Tmi
5
2
.
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This implies that θ˜m = 5
2
: The incumbent rations more than half of the market
(5
2
> 5−1
2
= 2). The incumbent’s profit can be rewritten as follows
pimi (T
m
i ) =
1
Tmi
(
25
16
− Fi
)
.
Assuming that 25
16
− Fi > 0, the incumbent will choose Tmi = T .
This allocation yields a profit for the incumbent, surplus for consumers and social
welfare equal to
pimi =
1
T
(
25
16
− Fi
)
,
SCm =
25
32
1
T
,
SWm =
∫ θ
θ˜m
[
1
T
θ − pmi
]
1
∆θ
dθ =
1
T
(
75
32
− Fi
)
.
Competition. We assume for simplicity that Fe = 0. With a uniform distribution,
the entrant is likely to offer a lower travel time (and therefore a larger price) than
the incumbent since the former has a lower cost than the latter and that (roughly
speaking) there are the same proportions of travellers with a high willingness to pay
than of travellers with a low willingness to pay. The demand faced by the entrant
is then Dce =
1
∆θ
(θ − θ˜c); the demand for the incumbent becomes Dci = 1∆θ (θ˜c − θ).
Superscript ‘c’ stands for ‘competition’.
Solving the price competition stage yields
pc,1i =
(
1
T c,1e
− 1
T c,1i
)
,
pc,1e = 3
(
1
T c,1e
− 1
T c,1i
)
.
Plugging the values of the prices in the profit functions and optimizing with respect
to the frequencies leads to
• For the entrant: dpic,1e
dT c,1e
(T c,1i , T
c,1
e ) < 0. Therefore, the entrant will choose the
smallest travel time, i.e., T ce = T .
• For the incumbent: dpic,1i
dT c,1i
(T c,1i , T
c,1
e ) > 0 and the incumbent will choose the
highest travel time, i.e., T c,1i = T .
At the equilibrium of this first entry scenario, profits of the different operators,
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Sufficiently high
travel time differential
Sufficiently low
travel time differential
Sufficiently high
fixed cost
pic,1i ≥ pimi pic,1i ≤ pimi
Sufficiently low
fixed cost
pic,1i ≤ pimi pic,1i ≤ pimi
Table 2: Incumbent’s profit under monopoly and entry when the entrant targets
the most profitable segments.
consumers’ surplus and social welfare are equal to
pic,1i =
1
T
(
T − T
4T
− Fi
)
,
pic,1e =
9
4TT
(
T − T) ,
SCc,1 =
23T + T
8TT
,
SW c,1 =
21T + 3T
8TT
− 1
T
Fi.
There are some constraints to ensure that these expressions are positive. In
particular, we must have Fi ≤ min{2516 ; 14 T−TT }.
Depending on the level of fixed cost of the incumbent Fi and the travel time
differential T − T , we obtain the Table 2
The most interesting situation concerns the case of a high fixed cost and a high
frequency differential. A high fixed cost means that the incumbent under monopoly
does not earn a lot of profit. Moreover, remember that under monopoly the incum-
bent offers the smallest travel time T .
With competition, and in that scenario, the entrant replaces the incumbent in
the following sense: It will offer low travel time trains while the incumbent will
now offer high travel time trains. When the travel time differential is large enough,
this means that price competition is not too intense and that the incumbent still
benefits from a sufficiently large demand; simultaneously, the incumbent is now able
to drastically reduce its cost since it offers the largest travel time. In that case, the
introduction of competition does not reduce the incumbent’s profit. In the other
case, however, the incumbent’s profit will decrease after the entry of a competitor.
We emphasize that this result has a broader interpretation. When the incumbent
adapts to entry, then it is sometimes profitable to let the entrant target the most
profitable segments of the travellers population. Indeed, those segments require to
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Sufficiently high
travel time differential
Sufficiently low
travel time differential
Variation of
incumbent’s
profit
pic,2i ≥ pimi pic,2i ≤ pimi
Table 3: Incumbent’s profit under monopoly and entry when the entrant targets
the less profitable segments.
set a high level of ‘quality’ (frequency, comfort, speed) and therefore generate a
high cost. If the differentiation between competitors is sufficiently large so that
price competition is not too intense, then the incumbent prefers to focus on the low
profitability segments to reduce its costs.
Finally, as concerns welfare, we show that
SW c,1 ≥ SWm.
Indeed, competition enables to attenuate the incumbent’s market power and to
reduce the incumbent’s cost: Both effects tend to increase unambiguously welfare.
3.5.2 Second case: Entrant (incumbent) on the less (most) profitable
segments
Consider now the other possible equilibrium. Since the benchmark case is un-
changed, we directly go to the analysis of competition.
Competition. The computations can be immediately adapted from the previous
case and will not be repeated here. We simply note that the incumbent’s profit and
social welfare are equal to
pic,2i =
9
4T
T − T
T
− 1
T
Fi,
SW c,2 =
21T + 3T
8TT
− 1
T
Fi.
As previously, we note that SW c,2 ≥ SWm: Competition always improves wel-
fare with respect to the monopoly situation.
Consider the variation of the incumbent’s profit in that case. Since the incumbent
sticks to the smallest travel time level, it has the same total cost under monopoly and
under competition. Therefore, the variation of the incumbent’s profit only depends
on the travel time differential, as shown in Table 3. The intuition is the following.
The introduction of competition leads to an increase of the total demand for train
transport services: More travellers are now willing to travel by train. This increase
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in total demand translates into an increase in the demand that addresses to each
operator.
However, the entry of a new competitor also triggers a price competition, whose
intensiveness depends on the differentiation between products. If the entrant’s prod-
uct is sufficiently differentiated from the incumbent’s one (and reciprocally) then the
price competition is not too intense. In that case, the incumbent’s profit increases.
If, on the contrary, the differentiation between the products offered by the entrant
and the incumbent is too low, then a vigourous price competition destroys the ben-
efit created by the increase in total demand.
3.5.3 Discussion
It should be emphasized that the illustration presented previously is strongly biased
in favor of competition. We should emphasize that the gain generated by the reduc-
tion of the incumbent’s market power can be more than offset if the entry costs are
sufficiently high: In that case, the monopoly situation is preferred from the view-
point of social welfare. In the same spirit, if the incumbent benefits from sufficiently
large returns to scale and/or density then competition may deteriorate welfare since
the erosion of the incumbent’s market share translates into a lower efficiency for this
operator.
3.5.4 Intermediate summary
Summing up, we have derived the following insights.
• When choosing a differentiation level (e.g., through the travel time for in-
stance) each operator must take into account two effects: The direct effect of
the chosen level of ‘quality’ on its cost and the strategic effect, that is to say,
the opportunity gain/cost associated with this choice, i.e., the amount which
reflects how this choice of the product’s attributes affect the behavior of the
entrant at the price competition stage.
• The strategic effect depends on characteristics of the demand function, on the
heterogeneity among the passenger population, on the technical constraints
that limit the set of product attributes that can be offered by competitors.
• Since the entrant and the incumbent are treated symmetrically, provided that
the efficiency differential is not too large, then different equilibrium config-
urations are possible. In all configurations, differentiation is maximal since
competitors have a strong incentive to soften the price competition. Which
competitor targets the most profitable segments may depend on the possibility
for one competitor to commit credibly to target those segments.
• When one competitor is much more efficient than the other, then the least
efficient operator is likely to be forced to exit the market even with maximal
service differentiation.
• The possibility of multiple industry configurations suggests a race to be the
first in order to target the most profitable segments.
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3.6 Extension: Impossibility of effective competition
3.6.1 The role of heterogeneity
The previous analysis requires some assumptions on the parameter values. For
instance, the demands of operators under competition and prices must be positive.
Instead of going through the whole list of different cases, we focus on one case, which
enables us to highlight a critical feature of the vertical differentiation model.
Consider that the willingness-to-pay of passengers is distributed uniformly on
[θ, θ]. Assume for convenience that the operators’ marginal costs are identical: ci =
ce ≡ c. In this case, solving the price competition stage yields (still assuming that
the entrant offers a higher travel time level than the incumbent)
pi(Ti, Te) =
1
3
[
3c+ (2θ − θ)∆ν(T )] ,
pe(Ti, Te) =
1
3
[
3c+ (θ − 2θ)∆ν(T ).]
Note that the demand that the incumbent (or more generally, the operator that
offers the highest frequency level) faces is always positive since θ > θ. However, for
the demand addressed to the entrant (or more generally, the operator that offers
the lowest frequency level) to be positive, the range of valuations in the population
must be large enough: θ > 2θ.
If this condition is not satisfied, we have the following interesting situation. At
the price equilibrium, the entrant faces no demand, and the incumbent charges a
strictly positive price. Therefore, the entrant is forced to exit the market. The
reverse scenario is also possible if the entrant succeeds to credibly commit to be
present on the high-valuations segments of the passenger population.
Hence, even when entry is costless, there is only one operator in the market at
equilibrium. When heterogeneity among passengers is small, intense price competi-
tion drives the high travel time operator out of the market. The intuition is that,
when the lower quality is very low then the demand of the low quality operator is
too low; if it is high, then it triggers an intense price competition among opera-
tors. When heterogeneity is small, there is not enough ‘room’ for competitors to
differentiate their products without triggering an intense price competition.
Accordingly we should not expect the market shares of the different operators to
equalize as competition develops. This depends on the heterogeneity of the market,
i.e., on the possibility for competitors to soften the price competition.
Moreover, we should expect competition to develop only in the markets charac-
terized by a sufficiently large degree of heterogeneity in the passenger population.
Indeed, in such markets, competitors find enough demand, even with services differ-
entiated from the rivals’ services which soften price competition. It is an important
difference with the horizontal differentiation setting, where, when there are no entry
cost, there is always an incentive to enter the market since any entrant anticipates
a small but positive market power.
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Summary 6: Assume that the heterogeneity in the popula-
tion is small, i.e., that the differences in willingness-to-pay
for train services across passengers are small. 1) There is
only one operator present on the market. Two configurations
are possible: Either the entrant replaces the incumbent, or the
entrant does not enter the market. 2) Which configuration
prevails depends on the possibility of committing credibly to
target the most profitable segments of the passenger popula-
tion (i.e., to offer a sufficiently high ‘quality’ level) in order
to threaten the competitor if it attempts to enter/stay active.
Finally, we emphasize that heterogeneity is different from
market size. If the size of the market is sufficiently small
so that on-the-track competition is not viable per se, then the
entrant is obviously not willing to enter the market. Small
heterogeneity means that there is not enough diversity in the
passengers’ willingness-to-pay for the competitors to differen-
tiate sufficiently and to escape from an intense price competi-
tion.
Finally, note that a more general point has been made by Shaked and Sutton
(1983). Oligopolistic competition with vertical differentiation leads to a finite num-
ber of operators that enter the market in the long run. Indeed, price competition
between operators offering high quality products erodes the demand for low quality
products. Therefore, when the number of operators present on the market is suf-
ficiently large, there is no room for operators offering lower quality products and
entry does no longer occurs even when it is costless.
3.6.2 The role of ‘concentration’ and demand elasticity
In the previous analysis, we considered that passengers’ valuations were uniformly
distributed. As we explained, this had some consequences on the choice of differen-
tiation level by the incumbent and the entrant.
In this part, we study the case where demand is concentrated around the low-
est valuation type. This means that there are much more potential passengers
with small willingness-to-pay for transport services than passengers with a large
willingness-to-pay.
Consider that the density is distributed according to g(θ) = θθ
∆θ
1
θ2
on [θ, θ]. There-
fore, the willingness-to-pay are mostly concentrated around θ and the proportion of
passengers with high willingness-to-pay decreases quickly.
Monopoly. Consider first the case of an incumbent with a monopoly position.
Given a threshold θ˜ = pi
ν(Ti)
, the demand for the incumbent is given by
D(pi, Ti) =
θ
∆θ
θ − θ˜
θ˜
,
37
which decreases as θ˜ increases. At equilibrium, we have θ˜ = θ or pi = θν(Ti). The
intuition goes as follows. If the monopoly increases its price and excludes from the
market passengers with the lowest willingness-to-pay in order to charge a higher
price on the remaining passengers, then it looses a lot of demand. In a concentrated
market, it is not a profitable strategy. So the incumbent prefers to serve the whole
market.
As a complement way, the elasticity of demand for the monopoly is
 =
θ
θ − θ˜ . (8)
For all passengers with types θ ∈ [θ˜, θ], the incumbent acts as a monopoly and offers
a price which depends on the demand elasticity. An increase in the price reduces
the demand but enables to charge a higher price on the other passengers. When
the demand elasticity is sufficiently large, the incumbent prefers offering a low price
to attract more passengers. Then, the incumbent chooses the highest travel time,
Ti = T .
Competition. Assume now that a competitor has entered the market. Simple
computations show that it is never possible to have a situation in which the incum-
bent and the entrant simultaneously compete on the market. The intuition is the
following. Since demand is concentrated around θ, there is a strong incentive for
both competitors to offer a low price in order to attract the large mass of passengers
with low willingness-to-pay for transport services. Assume that the entrant replaces
the incumbent (i.e., it targets the high-valuations segments while the incumbent
switches to the low-valuations segments). Since both operators are willing to serve
the same passengers, this ends up with the incumbent being forced to offer a nega-
tive price to compensate for its lower quality, i.e., to exit the market. The reciprocal
scenario occurs when we assume that the incumbent offers the high quality: in that
case, the entrant is forced to exit the market.
The demand elasticity when the distribution is uniform is  = (θ − θ˜)−1, which
is (much) smaller than the one defined in Equation (8) when θ is large. We have
determined the equilibrium when the distribution is decreasing over its support in a
linear way (the market is therefore still concentrated around θ). In this situation, we
show that entry with both competitors present on the market is possible (this will
not be detailed here). This comparison highlights the role of the demand elasticity
to determine the entry scenario.
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Summary 7: Assume that the demand mainly emanates from
potential passengers with low willingness-to-pays for train
transport services and that this demand has a high price-
elasticity (i.e., a small increase of price generates a large
fall in demand). 1) The incumbent with a monopoly posi-
tion serves the entire market. 2) It is not possible to have
both competitors simultaneously active on the market because
both competitors seek to offer products which are not suffi-
ciently differentiated (to be close to the demand) and enter in
a tough price competition.
4 Entry barriers
4.1 Introduction
In the previous section, we considered situations in which the incumbent and the
entrant were symmetric in the following sense: They take their decisions about the
price and the differentiation level simultaneously. This might be a good approxima-
tion of a mid-term situation, when some competitors have successfully entered some
particular markets.
However, the incumbent has a privileged position in the industry, in particular
at the outset of the process of opening markets to competition when competition is
at an infant stage.
What is the optimal strategy of the incumbent faced to the threat of entry and
what is the impact of the incumbent’s strategy on the potential entrant?
First, some elements of market structure can prevent a free entry in an industry.
Bain (1956) defined entry barriers as a characteristic that enables operators to realize
supra-normal profits despite the entry threat. For instance, scale economies and
absolute cost advantages provide operators already present on the market with an
advantage with respect to potential entrants. Another entry barrier might be the
need for capital. For instance, banks might be less eager to lend to new entrants
because they are less known than the incumbent; or entrants might be prevented
from growing as the incumbent inflicts losses on the product market in order to
reduce their ability to finance new investments.
More interesting, the incumbent’s behavior might also be an entry barrier for
potential entrants. Three types of strategy are available for the incumbent threaten
by entry.
• Entry is blockaded: The incumbent does not modify its behavior (i.e., it acts
as if there were no entry threat) but entrants do not find it attractive to enter
the market. For instance, when the demand that the incumbent faces has a
very high price elasticity, the entrant might not find it profitable since the
market might not allow two operators to operate without loss.
• Entry is prevented: In that case, entry cannot be blockaded but the incumbent
modifies its behavior in order to prevent entry by new competitor.
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• Adaptation to entry: The incumbent finds it preferable to let the potential
competitors entering the market rather than building costly entry barriers to
prevent entry. However, its behavior is modified to account for entry.
4.2 An illustration of entry barriers: Crowding out the
product spectrum
In order to introduce different notions, we present the following example. Con-
sider the vertical differentiation setting of the previous section. Passengers demand
transport services from point A to point B; they are vertically differentiated and the
heterogeneity parameter θ is uniformly distributed on [θ, θ]. The AB-trip is initially
serviced by the incumbent operator only. A potential competitor may enter the
market. If it enters the market, then it must pay a strictly positive entry fixed cost
γentry. Letting aside the question of effects of competition on product differentiation,
we assume that the entrant has chosen a given travel time T .
In the previous section we made the assumption that the incumbent, as well as
the entrant, could produce only one service (a service being identified with its travel
time and its price). This is a reasonable assumption if the cost of implementing
an additional service is prohibitively high for the incumbent.20 However, there are
instances in which the incumbent operator may be willing to set up a new service in
anticipation of entry of the segment AB. In this section, we allow the incumbent to
introduce a new service before entry may eventually take place, although at a fixed
and irretrievable fixed cost γnew service.
Summing up, the timing of decisions is as follows. In a first time, the incumbent
decides whether to set up a new service with given attributes on the AB-trip or
not. Then, in a second time, the entrant decides whether to invade the AB segment
or not. Finally, in the third stage, price competition between the entrant and the
incumbent takes place if entry occurred; otherwise, the incumbent behaves as a
monopoly.
The incumbent sets up only one service. It has decided not to implement a
new service at the first stage of the game. The second stage of the game has an
immediate solution. If the potential competitor has not entered the market, the
incumbent has monopoly position on the AB market. If the competitor has entered
the market, then, given that the attribute of the entrant’s product is fixed, i.e.,
Te = T , the outcome is the same as in the previous section on oligopolistic compe-
tition with endogenous differentiation. Finally, provided that the heterogeneity is
sufficiently large (in order to ensure that the entrant targeting the lower-valuations
segments will earn a positive profit gross of the entry cost), or more generally that
the market is sufficiently attractive, the entrant is ready to pay the cost to enter the
market.
The incumbent sets up two services. It provides an additional service. Assume
that the travel time associated with this new service is the largest possible travel
20This might be the case if the planning schedule is tight and cannot afford another service on
the trip considered.
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time.21
There is a potentially non negligible cost (γnew service) to implement a new service
by the incumbent. Moreover, since this service is identical to the product that
would be offered by the entrant if the latter decides to enter the market, the price
competition between the entrant and the incumbent on this market will be very
tough: Price competition between these two homogenous goods leads to average
cost pricing and zero profit.22 For the sake of simplicity, assume that the entrant
and the incumbent have identical cost functions. Therefore, the incumbent makes
no profit or loss on the new service.
On the basis of the direct cost of implementing the new service, the incumbent
operator does not find it profitable to run this service. However, there is also an
opportunity gain to be considered. Indeed, the decision of producing a second
service affects the potential competitor’s entry decision at the second stage of the
game. Indeed, if the entrant decides to enter the market and the incumbent has
formerly decided to set up a new product, then the entrant expects an intense price
competition which undermines the chances to recover the fixed cost of entry. In
this case, the entrant may decide not to enter the market since the entry cost is
irretrievable.
By crowding out the products spectrum, the incumbent has managed to prevent
entry. Through the introduction of a new service, the incumbent has committed to
an aggressive behavior ex post. When entry is sufficiently costly, the commitment to
an intense price competition ex post deters the potential competitor from entering
the market.
4.3 Analysis of strategies
It should be kept in mind that the ‘entry deterrence’ strategy has a cost for the
incumbent: The commitment to an intense price competition ex post requires that
the incumbent sets up a new product, which involves the fixed cost γnew service. If
that cost is too high, then the incumbent might prefer the ‘adapt to entry’ strategy,
in which case it does not prevent entry by the competitor. However, the incum-
bent might still be willing to undertake some decisions to soften the ex post price
competition.
In general, which strategy is the best for the incumbent depends on the values of
different parameters. We do not describe the different cases here. More importantly,
while the ‘entry deterrence’ strategy only depends on the impact of the incumbent’s
before-entry decision on the entrant’s profit, the ‘adaptation of entry’ strategy de-
pends on the strategic interaction between the operators’ decision variables at the
competition stage. We illustrate these points now.
21Given our timing, this choice should of course be endogenous. However, this is not important
to illustrate our point.
22We implicitly assume the the cost function of the incumbent operator is separable in the
different prices.
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4.3.1 A simple model
Consider the following highly stylized model.23 There are two operators, an incum-
bent and a potential entrant. There are two periods in order to account for the
capacity of the incumbent to commit to undertake certain actions today to affect
competition with the entrant that may take place tomorrow.
In the first period, the incumbent chooses an investment variable Ki. This
investment should be understood in a broad sense: It might be the decision to offer
a new service, or the decision to adopt a particular differentiation level for instance.
Then, the entrant observes the decisionKi undertaken by the incumbent and decides
whether to enter the market or not.24 If it does not enter, then the entrant makes
no profit; the incumbent enjoys a monopoly position and makes profit
pimi (Ki, x
m
i (Ki)),
where xmi (Ki) is the monopoly choice at the second period as function of the first
period investment Ki. For instance, xi can be the price or the output associated to
the incumbent’s service. If the potential operator has entered the market, then they
simultaneously decide the second period variables xi and xe and earn respectively{
pii(xi(Ki), xe(Ki)) for the incumbent,
pie(xi(Ki), xe(Ki)) for the entrant.
If the entrant has to bear a fixed cost of entry, then we assume that this cost is part
of pie. Let x
∗
i (Ki) and x
∗
e(Ki) be the second period equilibrium decision variables
respectively. Finally, Ri(xe) (respectively, Re(xi)) is the optimal choice of second
period decision by the incumbent (respectively, the entrant) for a given decision xe of
the entrant (respectively, for a given decision xi by the incumbent). That is to say:
Ri(xe) ≡ argmax
xi
pii(Ki, xi, xe) (respectively, Re(xi) ≡ argmax
xe
pie(Ki, xi, xe)). The
second period equilibrium decisions x∗i and x
∗
e are such that each competitor does
not want to deviate from this decision given the decision of its rival: x∗i = Ri(x
∗
e)
and x∗e = Re(x
∗
i ).
4.3.2 First strategy: Deterrence of entry
Entry is deterred when the incumbent chooses Ki at the first period such that the
profit of the entrant is negative, i.e., pie(Ki, x
∗
i (Ki), x
∗
e(Ki)) ≤ 0. Thus, in order to
prevent entry, the incumbent must choose a level of investment Kdi such that
pie(K
d
i , x
∗
i (K
d
i ), x
∗
e(K
d
i )) = 0.
23This is a simplified version of Chapter 8 of Tirole (1988).
24Once again, we consider a single market. More complicated situations stemming from the
network structure for instance are addressed later on.
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In order to determine which strategy should the incumbent adopt in order to prevent
entry, look at the impact of Ki on the entrant’s profit
dpie
dKi
=
∂pie
∂Ki︸︷︷︸
Direct Effect
+
∂pie
∂xe
∂x∗e
∂Ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∂pie
∂xi
∂x∗i
∂Ki
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic Effect
Note that, at the second period of the game, the entrant optimally chooses its
decision variable xe, implying that
∂pie
∂xe
= 0.
The incumbent’s investment Ki may have a direct impact on the entrant’s profit.
For instance, if Ki is the value of the clientele accumulated by the incumbent before
the entry of the other operator, a larger clientele reduces the size of the market
and thus lowers the entrant’s profit independently of the strategic effect. If the
investment Ki modifies the incumbent’s technology then there is no direct effect:
∂pie
∂Ki
= 0.
The strategic effect comes from the fact that the choice of Ki at the first period
of the game changes the incumbent’s behavior ex post by
∂x∗i
∂Ki
, thus affecting the
entrant’s profit in proportion to ∂pie
∂xi
.
The total effect is given by the addition of the direct and strategic effects. In
the sequel, the incumbent operator is said to be tough when dpie
dKi
< 0 and soft when
dpie
dKi
> 0. In order to deter entry, the incumbent wants to look tough.
4.3.3 Second strategy: Accommodation of entry
Suppose now that the incumbent finds it too costly to deter entry. Whereas the
incumbent’s first period behavior was dictated by the entrant’s profit which had to
be driven down to zero, it is now driven by the incumbent’s profit. The impact
of the first period investment on the incumbent’s profit can be understood via the
following expression
dpii
dKi
=
∂pii
∂Ki︸︷︷︸
Direct Effect
+
∂pii
∂xi
∂x∗i
∂Ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∂pii
∂xe
∂x∗e
∂Ki
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic Effect
The logic underlying the different terms of this expression is the same as in the entry
deterrence case.
4.3.4 Links between the two strategies and discussion
The sign of the strategic effect in the case of accommodation to entry can be re-
lated to the nature of the strategic interaction and to the investment making the
incumbent tough or soft.25 Indeed, we have
dx∗e
dKi
=
dx∗e
dxi
× dx
∗
i
dKi
= R′e(x
∗
i )×
dx∗i
dKi
.
25We also assume that ∂pii∂xe and
∂pie
∂xi
have the same sign. This arises in most models of oligopolistic
competition and is not a restrictive assumption.
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Then we obtain
Sign
(
dpii
dKi
)
= Sign
(
dpie
dKi
)
×R′e(x∗i ).
Whereas the strategy in the entry deterrence case is simply contingent on the in-
vestment affecting the strength of the incumbent, the strategy in the entry accom-
modation case is now more ‘complex’: It depends not only on the investment effect
on the power of the incumbent but also on the strategic interaction (i.e., the sign of
slopes of reaction functions).
To illustrate this point, consider the following game: Choice of differentiation
level by the incumbent at the first stage, followed by price competition at the sec-
ond stage. Assume that prices are strategic complements, a characteristic stemming
from the demand and cost functions. The investment is taken here to be the choice
of differentiation by the incumbent: This choice makes the incumbent soft. There-
fore the incumbent has an incentive to overinvest: Indeed, over-investment at the
first period involves a higher price for the incumbent at the second period; since
prices are strategic complements, this entails a higher price for the entrant. An
opposite conclusion holds when prices are strategic substitutes, since an increase in
the incumbent’s price triggers a decrease in the entrant’s price.
Recall that the important assumption here is the credibility of the first period
decision by the incumbent. Differently stated, it must bind the incumbent to act
in a certain way. This implies that the entrant must anticipate that the incumbent
will stick to this strategy. This will typically be the case if the investment decision
involves substantial sunk cost, i.e., costs which are not retrievable.
When the credibility of the investment is not ascertained, which occurs for in-
stance when the investment is interpreted as the decision to offer a new service and
when the incumbent can decide to withdraw one of its services following the en-
try decision by the competitor, then the investment decision looses its commitment
value. The purpose of the next section is to focus on such cases and to show that
entry might nevertheless be deterred because of network externalities.
5 Entry, fixed costs and the role of network ex-
ternalities
5.1 Introduction
The previous sections apply to any industry. We consider a situation which is more
relevant for the actual railway industry. It involves an incumbent operating a net-
work. The structure of the network generates a pattern of substitutabilities and
complementarities between the different services offered by the incumbent. Depend-
ing on the interaction between these services, the incentives to enter the market by
a potential entrant are different. An entrant is more (respectively, less) likely to
enter a part of the network in which the incumbent offered multiple services which
are substitutes (respectively, complements) from the viewpoint of passengers. With
substitutes, the incumbent has incentives to withdraw from one market in order to
soften the competition with the entrant. On the contrary, with complements, the
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incumbent benefits from competition in one segment on the remaining parts of the
network through spillovers effects. It is therefore more likely to remain active on
that segment than the entrant.
5.2 Entry and exit in the case of substitutes
5.2.1 The intuition behind the main result
An entrant is likely to invade a part of the network where the incumbent produces
substitutable services. Indeed the incumbent has an incentive to withdraw from the
market where entry occurred in order to reduce the impact of entry on the sub-
stitutable services that the incumbent continues to offer. This impact may come
either from constraints that affect the pricing decisions of the incumbent (the inter-
dependency or arbitrage constraint) or from simple effects of demand substitution
between different types of services offered by the incumbent.
5.2.2 The model
We study the conditions under which an entrant may successfully enter a given
segment of the railway network and the impact of such entry on the profitability of
incumbent operator. The emphasis is on the role of the structure of the network
operated by the incumbent.
The network structure and the pattern of demands. The railway network
is highly simplified: There are only three cities denoted by A, B and C. All nodes
are connected. There are three services: AB, BC and AC.
There are two types of demand for round trip services. First, some passengers
travel between A and B or between B and C. The demand on Origin-Destination
od is denoted by Dod(pod) if the price on this market is pod, od ∈ {AB,BC}. There
are passengers who travel from A to C; the demand on this market is denoted by
DAC(pAC) where pAC is the price on this market. There are no substitutabilities
among O − D markets. Differently stated, passengers on a specific OD do not
substitute this trip for another one.
The incumbent offers direct services between all city pairs, i.e., ODs.
Cost structure. Assume that, on each OD-market, a proportion γ of the cost for
establishing a service between two cities is sunk. That is, γF is the sunk entry cost
and (1 − γ)F can be recovered upon exit, i.e., if the operator decides to withdraw
its service for the pair of cities considered. Differently stated, γF is a fixed entry
cost while (1− γ)F is a fixed production cost. We assume that exit costs are equal
to zero.26
The incumbent (respectively, the entrant) operator has a marginal cost denoted
ci (respectively, ce). The entrant is a priori more efficient than the incumbent, i.e.,
ce ≤ ci.
26Our model could be easily modified to account for exit costs.
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Market structure. Consider the following possible market structures. The bench-
mark is the monopoly situation where an incumbent operates the whole network.
As already mentioned, competition is modelled in a simplified manner, namely a` la
Bertrand (i.e., price competition). As an alternative, we allow for entry by a com-
petitor on a local market, AB for instance. Notice that on a given market/segment
there is no differentiation between the services offered by the different operators.
This is represented in Figure 6.
A
B
C
Entrant
Incumbent
( )ABAB pD ( )BCBC pD
( )ACAC pD
Figure 6: A three-city network: The incumbent operates the whole network, the
entrant may enter only in a local market.
5.2.3 No entry
Consider the case in which the incumbent operator has a monopoly position over
all the different markets. It sets the different prices pAB, pBC and pAC in order to
maximize its profit given by27
pimi = 2 (pAB − ci)DAB(pAB)+2 (pBC − ci)DBC(pBC)+2 (pAC − 2ci)DAC(pAC)−3F,
where superscript m stands for ‘monopoly’. The first two terms represent the in-
cumbent’s profit on the local markets, the third one represents the profit on the
AC-market. Since it is present on the three markets, the incumbent bears a total
fixed cost equal to 3F .
The monopolist incumbent sets the prices such that
pmod − ci
pmod
=
1
od(pmod)
for od ∈ {AB,BC},
27In this model, we consider that the marginal cost of AC is twice the marginal cost of AB or
BC.
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and
pmAC − 2ci
pmAC
=
1
AC(pmAC)
.
These rules are standard: The monopoly imposes a price such that the relative
markup of the price over the marginal cost is inversely proportional to the demand
elasticity.
When demands for each OD markets are identical, DAB = DBC = DAC ≡ D,
assuming that the elasticity (p) of demand D(.) is (weakly) increasing in the price
p, it can be shown that
pAB + pBC ≥ pAC
holds for the monopoly prices pmod, od ∈ {AB,BC,AC}.28 Herein, we call this
inequality on the prices the interdependency constraint (IC). It says that the AC-
passengers are not willing to substitute the direct AC trip for an indirect “AB plus
BC” trip. Note that this result would be reinforced had we assumed that passengers
from A to C with a change in B must bear a positive waiting cost.
This interdependency constraint might become binding when demands on the
different markets are not equal. If demands are different between the AC-market
and the local markets AB and BC, then we could obtain that the monopoly price
on the AC market is much larger than the sum of the monopoly prices on the AB
and BC markets. When this is the case, the interdependency constraint is not
satisfied by the previous prices; the optimal monopoly prices constrained by the
interdependency constraint are defined as follows
p˜mod − ci
p˜mod
=
1
od(p˜mod)
+
λ
od(p˜mod)Dod(p˜
m
od)
for the local market od ∈ {AB,BC},
p˜mAC − 2ci
p˜mAC
=
1
AC(p˜mAC)
− λ
AC(p˜mAC)DAC(p˜
m
AC)
for the long distance market,
where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the interdependency constraint.
This variable gives the shadow cost of the constraint, i.e., how much the incumbent
looses profit by distorting the prices away from the unconstrained monopoly prices
in order to satisfy the interdependency constraint. The larger λ is, the more costly
it is for the incumbent to ensure that the interdependency constraint is satisfied.
The impact of the interdependency constraints on the final prices is clear: the
prices on the local markets increase, p˜mod ≥ pmod for od ∈ {AB,BC}, and the price
on the long distance market decreases, p˜mAC ≤ pmAC . The extent of the increase
on a given local market depends both on the elasticity of the demand associated
with this market and on the size of this market. If the demand elasticity in the AB
market is very large, i.e., passengers in this market are highly sensitive to small price
variations, the incumbent does not distort too much this price and ensures that the
interdependency constraint is satisfied through distortions on the other markets.
28Consider that demands are identical. From the first-order conditions, 2pod(1 − 1/(pod)) =
pAC(1− 1/(pAC)). As the price elasticity is nondecreasing, then 2pod ≤ pAC .
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5.2.4 Entry on the local market
Now that a potential competitor enters the local market AB. This entrant only
enters a local market.
The incumbent may either adapt to entry or withdraw from the local market.
In the former case, head-to-head price competition on the local market AB takes
place. In the latter case, the incumbent is present on the AC and BC markets while
the entrant has a monopoly position on AB.
The incumbent withdraws from the local market where entry occurred.
Specifically, the incumbent decides to withdraw from the AB market following the
entry. The entrant faces no constraints and will offer a price peAB given by
peAB − ce
peAB
=
1
AB(peAB)
.
Obviously, we have peAB ≥ ce.
Concerning the incumbent, different cases may occur.
• Small efficiency differential: When the entrant is slightly more efficient than
the entrant, then we have peAB close to p
m
AB. Then, if the interdependency
constraint were not binding before entry, it is likely that this constraint is
not binding after entry. In that case, the incumbent enjoys the unconstrained
monopoly profit on the BC and AC markets and saves on the fixed cost of
production since it has withdrawn from the AB market. If the interdependency
constraint were initially binding, then it is likely to be still binding after entry.
Since the incumbent has withdrawn its service on the AB market, it has less
instrument at his disposal to ensure that this constraint is satisfied: this implies
that the distortion on the BC and AC markets is amplified.
• Large efficiency differential: Consider now that the entrant is much more
efficient than the incumbent. In that case, even the monopoly price of the
entrant on the AB market might be relatively small as compared to the mo-
nopolist incumbent’s price. Therefore, the interdependency constraint is likely
to be binding after entry, even if it was not the case before entry took place.
From the incumbent’s point of view, the cost associated with the entry of a com-
petitor not only involves the loss of the market (when the incumbent withdraws)
but the effects on the different markets which are related by the interdependency
constraint.
For further reference, note that provided that the entrant’s monopoly price on
AB is not too different from the incumbent’s monopoly price, the incumbent’s pric-
ing decisions on the other markets might not be affected: The incumbent looses the
AB market but saves on the fraction of fixed cost that can be recovered without
distorting too much the prices on the other markets.
The incumbent stays on the local market where entry occurred. Specif-
ically the incumbent decides to stay on the AB market following the entry by the
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competitor. Price competition on the homogenous good AB market occurs and is
fierce. The competitor with the lowest price wins the entire market.
First, suppose that the interdependency constraint is not binding whatever the
price on the AB market. Since markets are independent, the outcome is easy to
draw: On the AB market, price competition between the incumbent and the entrant
leads the entrant to win the entire market at a price peAB = ci. If the entrant is more
efficient than the incumbent, it can always undercut the incumbent. In this case,
the incumbent makes no profit on the AB segment, still enjoys a (unconstrained)
monopoly position on the other markets, but has to pay the totality of the fixed cost
(entry and production fixed costs). In other words, assuming that the interdepen-
dency constraint is not binding, the incumbent has always an incentive to withdraw
from the AB market since it is not able to save on the fixed cost.
Second, assume that the interdependency constraint is binding. Note that the
incumbent cannot propose a price piAB on the AB-market that is smaller than its
marginal cost ci. Therefore, when the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent,
it is always able to undercut the incumbent by proposing a lower price on the AB
market and still makes a positive profit on that market. Now suppose that the
incumbent offers a price on the AB-market such that piAB = p˜
m
od; then the entrant
undercuts the incumbent’s price and offers peAB slightly below p˜
m
ij . However, the
incumbent would have an incentive to undercut the entrant’s price since it would
win the AB-market at a price strictly below p˜mod which, since the AB-price would
be reduced, would entail larger distortions on the other markets. Therefore, there
exists a threshold pˆiAB, with p˜
m
AB > pˆ
i
AB > ci, above which the incumbent is not
willing to win the entire AB-market. A low price on AB implies larger distortions
both on AC and BC in order that the interdependency constraint be satisfied.
Therefore, when the incumbent remains on the AB market, it looses that market.
The entrant then offers a price which enable to win the market, i.e., peAB = pˆ
i
AB.
The entry and exit decisions. From the above analysis, provided that (i) the
entrant is more efficient than the incumbent or (ii) the incumbent is constrained
by the interdependency constraint, the entrant enters the local market AB and the
incumbent will withdraw its services from this market.
The intuition goes as follows. If the incumbent stays on the local AB-market,
then Bertrand competition (with perfectly substitutable services) on the AB-market
drives prices to marginal cost. Therefore, even if it wins the market, the incumbent
makes no profit on that local market since the price is equal to the marginal cost;
simultaneously, such a low price on the local AB market strongly affects the pricing
decisions on the other markets when the interdependency constraint is binding.
Consequently, a withdrawal from the AB-market would enable the incumbent not
only to save on the fraction of fixed costs which are retrievable, but would also
triggers a higher price on the AB market since the entrant would enjoy a monopoly
position, thereby giving more freedom to the incumbent in its pricing decisions on
the other markets. This holds even if both competitors have the same efficiency.
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5.2.5 Discussion and extension
Summary 8: The withdrawal decision by the incumbent should
take into account not only the direct gains (such as the saving
on part of the fixed costs) or direct costs (such as the loss of the
AB market) but also the opportunity cost and gain associated
to such a decision. In our model, there is an opportunity
loss of staying on the local market AB and competing head-
to-head with the entrant since this might force the entrant’s
price to be very low, thereby limiting the pricing decisions of
the incumbent on other markets.
Entry when the incumbent offers multiple substitutable services without
the capacity to credibly commit. The same insight appears in a model in
which the incumbent is a multiproduct firm that produces imperfectly substitutable
services. Indeed, consider the following modification to the previous model.
The incumbent faces an heterogenous population of passengers. Some passengers
have relatively large valuations of time and are willing to pay a high price in order
to benefit from a fast transport service between two cities; other passengers have
relatively low valuations of time and are willing to travel with a slower train for a
lower price. Another possibility is to consider that the incumbent offers different
time slots for the same trip.
In those cases, the incumbent produces multiple products which are imperfect
substitutes from the passengers’ viewpoint. The fast/high quality service offered by
the incumbent might attract some passengers when the price differential becomes
not too large; conversely, the slow train might attract some passengers with high
valuations of time if the price differential starts being too large. Similarly, some
passengers might substitute one time slot to the other if the price differential starts
to be too important. To simplify, let us denote these two substitutable services A
and B.
Under monopoly, the incumbent sets its price for the different substitutable
products by accounting for the externalities across services.
Now consider the possibility of entry by a competitor on one of the services, say
product A, offered by the incumbent operator.
If the incumbent stays on the market of product A, then price competition on
that market between the entrant and the incumbent leads to a low price on that
market. If the incumbent decides to stay on the market, then it becomes likely that
both operators will suffer losses on that market. [For this analysis, it is only required
that price competition on one market leads to sufficiently low profits on that market
for the operators.]
The important point is that the incumbent has more incentive to withdraw from
the A-market than the entrant. Indeed, consider the entrant first. If it exits, it can
retrieve part of the total fixed cost. Consider now the incumbent. If it withdraws, it
can recoup part of the fixed cost of production, as does the entrant. However, since
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the situation is now a differentiated oligopoly (the entrant produces the A-service,
the incumbent the B-service, and services are substitutes), the entrant’s price on the
A-market will be equal to the corresponding monopoly price and will therefore be
larger than the price that would prevail on that market under Bertrand competition.
Since services are substitutes, the increase in the price of the A-market leads to an
increase of the demand on the B-market, where the incumbent enjoys a monopoly
position. Therefore, such a withdrawal by the incumbent benefits the incumbent
on the B-market. Anticipating this, the entrant effectively stays on the A market
leading the incumbent to exit from that market.
The lesson from the analysis can be summarized as follows. The incumbent
cannot preempt entry by entering all markets first if exit costs are sufficiently small,
if services are sufficiently substitutes from the passengers’ viewpoint, and if post-
entry competition is sufficiently intense. Similarly, preempting entry by crowding
out the products spectrum is not possible when the commitment to remain present
on the different substitutable services is not credible.29
A by-product of this analysis is the following. When an incumbent cannot com-
mit to stay on the different markets of substitutes that it offers, an entrant may find
that preferable to enter on a service already offered by the incumbent than on a new
service which would be only imperfectly substitutable with the ones offered by the
incumbent. The reason is that such a strategy reinforces the incumbent’s incentive
to withdraw from the market where entry occurred. Indeed, if entry occurred on a
differentiated service, then the impact of the substitutable markets is less important
than if entry occurred on a service already offered by the incumbent.
5.3 Entry and exit in the case of complements
Wel now address another issue, which also concerns the role of the network structure
on the incentive to enter.
It has been acknowledged that the railways network has the feature of a so-called
hub-spoke network. We shall build on a modified version of the model developed in
the previous subsection to highlight some of the implications of this characteristics.30
Basically, we keep the structure of the network (with three cities denoted by
A, B, and C). We simplify the demand pattern by assuming that the round trip
demands for each city-pair markets are identical (i.e., DAB = DAC = DBC ≡ D).
The cost structure is the same. The important change is that there is no direct
service from A to C: In order to travel from A to C, passengers must stop at B.
Therefore, a train service from A to C may also be used to transport passengers
from A to B and from B to C.
As previously, we consider the impact of entry on a local segment AB by a
competitor on the incumbent incentive to withdraw or stay on the local market.
The structure of the model is shown in Figure 7.
29See Judd (1985) for a more detailed model.
30A more detailed analysis can be found in Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997).
51
Passengers served by
-The entrant and the
incumbent if incumbent
stays following entry
-The entrant only
if incumbent exits
following entry
Passengers served only 
by the incumbent
A
B
C
Non-hub city Non-hub city
Hub city
Figure 7: A three-city network with a hub-city and no direct trip between
A and C.
5.3.1 Main result and intuition
The main result can be stated as follows. In a network with a hub-spoke structure,
the incumbent has a strategic advantage over the potential entrant and may not
withdraw from the local market where entry occurred. As a result, entry is likely to
be deterred when the potential entrant does not enjoy a substantial cost advantage
over the incumbent.
Intuitively, entry on the local market AB has a spillover effect on the connect-
ing market AC. With the new specification of the services, the network exhibits
a pattern of complementarities between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s services.
Therefore, the logic of the argument developed in Section 4.2 is reversed. By stay-
ing on the market where entry occurred, the incumbent engages in a vigorous price
competition (which also erodes the profit of the winning operator on that market).
Since connecting services are complements due to the hub-spoke feature of the net-
work, the price competition increases the demand on the complementary markets.
Indeed, when the entrant wins the AB-market31, two cases appear: (i) if the in-
cumbent exits, then the entrant enjoys a monopoly position on the AB-market and
sets a high price on that market and on the connecting markets jointly serviced
with the incumbent; (ii) if the incumbent stays on the AB-market and shares the
connecting markets with the entrant, then it forces the entrant to reduce its prices.
The incumbent prefers the latter strategy to the former since the smaller price on
the AB-market increases the demand in the connecting and complementary markets
in which the incumbent still enjoys a monopoly position.
31Recall that, on the AB-market, the operators are offering perfectly homogenous services.
Therefore, Bertrand competition on that market leads to only one operator servicing the whole
demand. However, we would obtain a similar conclusion if, for instance, the competition between
the incumbent and the entrant is less ‘extreme’.
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Summary 9: In a network with a hub-spoke structure the in-
cumbent has a strategic advantage over the potential entrants
and may not withdraw from the local market where entry oc-
curs. Entry is therefore likely to be deterred when the potential
entrants do not enjoy a substantial cost advantage over the in-
cumbent and when the irretrievable entry cost are sufficiently
high.
Intuitively, entry on a local market has a positive spillover ef-
fect on the connecting markets served by the incumbent when
the network exhibits a pattern of complementarities between
the incumbent’s and the entrant’s services, which arises when
the network is a hub-spoke. By staying on the market where
entry occurred, the incumbent engages in a vigorous price
competition (which also erodes the profit of operators on this
market). Since connecting services are complements due to
the hub-spoke feature of the network, the price competition in-
creases the demand on the complementary markets. When the
entrant enters, two cases appear: (i) If the incumbent exits,
then the entrant enjoys a monopoly position on its market and
sets a high price on this market and on the connecting markets
jointly serviced with the incumbent; (ii) If the incumbent stays
on the market where entry has occurred and shares the con-
necting markets with the entrant, then it forces the entrant to
reduce its prices. The incumbent prefers the latter strategy to
the former since the smaller price on the market where entry
occurs increases demand in the connecting and complemen-
tary markets in which the incumbent still enjoys a monopoly
position.
5.3.2 The model
Prices are based upon cities of origin and destination. We denote by peod the price that
the entrant charges to od-passengers. If those passengers travel with the incumbent
exclusively then they pay piod; if they use both operators then they pay p
e
od + s
i
od
where siod is the price charged by the incumbent for its segment of the trip.
To summarize, AB-passengers can either travel with the incumbent and pay piAB
or they have the option to travel with the entrant and pay peAB (if entry occurred
of course). BC-passengers can only travel with the incumbent in which case they
are charged piBC . Finally, AC-passengers have the possibility to travel with the
incumbent only and pay piAC or to use both operators and pay p
e
AC + s
i
AC for the
total travel.
5.3.3 Assumptions
Let pm(ck) and pim(ck) be the price and the monopoly profit respectively associated
to a marginal cost ck.
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Assume that the monopoly profit from the direct traffic between two cities is not
large enough to cover the fixed cost of supplying that service. To ensure profitability,
the operators have to service other city-pair markets as well.
Finally, and not surprisingly, the strategic interaction plays an important role
in this analysis. This strategic interaction between the operators’ decision variables
arises when the operators jointly service the AC-market. In that case, the profit
(gross of fixed cost) of the incumbent on that market is (siAC − ci)D(siAC +peAC) and
the entrant’s profit (gross of fixed cost) is given by (peAC − ci)D(siAC + peAC). The
first-order condition associated to, say, the entrant’s profit maximization problem
yields
(peAC − ci)D′(siAC + peAC) +D(siAC + peAC) = 0. (9)
The second-order condition associated to this maximization problem is
(peAC − ci)D′′(siAC + peAC) + 2D′(siAC + peAC) ≤ 0. (10)
Totally differentiating (9) and using (10), we obtain
dpeAC
dseAC
∝ (D′)2 −DD′′. (11)
Therefore, prices are strategic complements when the demand is linear or, more
generally, not too convex. If demand is sufficiently convex, then prices are strategic
substitutes. To be consistent with the previous part of our analysis, assume that
prices are strategic complements. The analysis remains unchanged qualitatively in
the case of strategic substitutes.32
In addition, assume that the efficiency differential between the incumbent and
the entrant is not too large, implying that the monopoly price of the entrant is larger
than the marginal cost of the incumbent, i.e., pm(ce) > ci.
5.3.4 No entry: The incumbent has a monopoly position over the whole
network
In that case, the monopolist incumbent’s profit maximization problem has a simple
solution. It consists in charging the monopoly price associated to marginal cost ci in
each direct market, i.e. piAB = p
i
BC = pm(ci), and the monopoly price corresponding
to twice the marginal cost in the connecting market AC, i.e., piAC = pm(2ci).
From the analysis in Subsection 5.2, we know that some constraints must be
satisfied, in particular those that ensure that AC-passengers are not willing to buy
two tickets, one for the AB-travel the other for the BC-travel, instead of the AC-
ticket. This imposes the following constraint to be satisfied
piAB + p
i
BC ≥ piAC . (12)
It is immediate to show that this constraint is indeed satisfied for the monopoly prices
defined previously when the demand elasticity is increasing in the price. Therefore,
32See Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997).
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the monopoly profit under no entry is
pino entryi = 4pim(ci) + 2pim(2ci)− 3F.
5.3.5 Entry on a local segment: The incumbent withdraws its services
from the market where entry occurred
We consider now that a potential entrant has decided to enter the AB-market and
that the incumbent reacts by withdrawing its services from that segment. Each
operator is then a monopoly on the local segment that it services: AB for the
entrant and BC for the incumbent. As concerns the AC-segment, the operators
jointly service this travel.
The profit of the entrant can be written as follows
pie = 2 (p
e
AB − ce)D(peAB) + 2 (peAC − ce)D(peAC + siAC)− F.
Note that we implicitly assumed that the entrant is able to discriminate between
the AB-passengers and the AC-passengers that use the entrant’s service on the
AB-segment of their trip. Moreover, we must ensure that
peAB ≥ peAC (13)
sinceAC-passengers always have the possibility to claim that they areAB-passengers
only.
Now consider the incumbent. Its profit can be rewritten as follows
pii = 2
(
piBC − ci
)
D(piBC) + 2
(
siAC − ci
)
D(peAC + s
i
AC)− F − γF.
The first term represents the incumbent’s profit in the local market where it is a
monopolist; the second term represents its profit on the AC-market jointly serviced
with the entrant. Finally, since the incumbent has withdrawn from the AB segment,
it saves a fraction 1−γ of the fixed cost F that it would have paid if it were staying
on that segment.
As for the entrant, the incumbent must ensure that the following constraint is
satisfied
piBC ≥ siAC . (14)
The important feature of the price equilibrium in that configuration is that the
entrant’s price in every market exceeds the marginal cost of the incumbent : peAB > ci
and peAC > ci. Indeed, remember that prices are strategic complements. This
implies that the best-response of the entrant is strictly increasing and starts from
the monopoly price pm(ce). Therefore, in equilibrium, we have p
e
AC ≥ pm(ce) and
peAB ≥ pm(ce). Using the assumption pm(ce) > ci, we obtain the result.
Since best-responses are increasing and equilibrium prices in the shared AC-
market are above the monopoly prices, the constraints defined in (14) and (13)
are binding at equilibrium. Therefore, competition in the shared market AC spills
over into the direct markets AB and BC since the incumbent cannot discriminate
between BC- and AC-passengers and must charge them the same price.
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5.3.6 Entry on a local segment: The incumbent stays on the market
where entry occurred
It remains to study the case in which entry occurs on AB and the incumbent does
not withdraw its service from that market. The first point to notice is that on the
AB market the entrant and the incumbent offers perfectly substitutable products.
Therefore, the operator that offers the lowest price wins the entire market (Bertrand
competition). The situation in the AC-market is slightly more complex. Indeed, the
incumbent can decide to share the market with the entrant or to service the market
alone, depending on how it sets its price piAC higher or lower than p
e
AC + s
i
AC .
The entrant’s profit can be written as follows
pie = 2× 1{peAB≤piAB} (peAB − ce)D
(
min{peAB, piAB}
)
+ 2× 1{peAC+siAC≤piAC} (peAC − ce)D
(
min{peAC + siAC , piAC}
)− F,
where 1 is the indicator function33. The entrant chooses the price peAB and possibly
the price peAC when the incumbent shares the AC-market with the entrant, subject
to the constraint (13).
Consider now the incumbent profit maximization’s problem. Its profit can be
written as follows
pii =2×
(
1− 1{peAB≤piAB}
) (
piAB − ci
)
D
(
min{peAB, piAB}
)
+ 2× 1{peAC+siAC≤piAC}
(
siAC − ci
)
D
(
min{peAC + siAC , piAC}
)
+ 2×
(
1− 1{peAC+siAC≤piAC}
) (
piAC − 2ci
)
D
(
min{peAC + siAC , piAC}
)
+ 2× (piBC − ci)D(piBC)− 3F.
The first term represents the profit on the market where entry occurred if the incum-
bent’s price is smaller than the entrant’s price. The second term is the incumbent’s
profit on the AC-market in a shared configuration, i.e., when the incumbent and the
entrant jointly service that market. By contrast, the third term is the incumbent’s
profit on the long distance AC-market when it does not share that market with the
entrant. Finally, the fourth and last term is the profit earned on the market where
the incumbent benefits from a monopoly position. The incumbent chooses its prices
in order to maximize its profit subject to the constraints (12) and (14).
The important result that we obtain can be stated as follows: The presence of
a perfect substitutes in the AB-market implies that the entrant’s prices in markets
AC and AB cannot exceed the marginal cost of the incumbent. The proof goes
along the following steps.
First, we show that peAC ≤ ci. Indeed, if peAC > ci, then piAC < peAC + siAC since
the incumbent can always obtain the entire AC-market and increase its by lowering
piAC . The constraints (14) and (13) implies that p
i
BC + p
e
AB ≥ siAC + peAC . Therefore,
piBC + p
e
AB > p
i
AC .
Consequently, the incumbent can always undercut the entrant’s price in the
AB-market without violating the constraint (12). The entrant can also undercut
33
1{a≤b} is equal to 1 if a ≤ b and 0 otherwise.
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the incumbent’s price in the AB-market and possibly make positive profits in the
AC market setting peAC = p
e
AB to satisfy (13). This implies that p
e
AB ≤ ci and a
contradiction is obtained by (13). Thus, peAC ≤ ci.
Second, we show that peAB ≤ ci. Suppose that peAB > ci. Then, we have to
consider two cases. In the first, piAB ≥ peAB and the incumbent makes zero profits
in the AB-market. If piAC ≤ peAC + siAC , then it follows from (14) and the above
result that piAC ≤ ci + piBC . Thus the incumbent can make positive profits by
undercutting the entrant’s price in the AB-market without violating the constraint
(12). If piAC > p
e
AC+s
i
AC , then set p
i
AC = p
e
AC+s
i
AC and repeat the above argument.
In the second case, ci ≤ piAB < peAB. The entrant can increase profits by setting
peAB = p
i
AB without violating (13) since p
e
AC ≤ ci. In both cases, a contradiction is
obtained.
Notice that we are not explicit on the nature of the price equilibrium that emerges
in this game. In general, either an accommodating equilibrium emerges, in which
the incumbent shares the AC-market with the entrant, or an isolating equilibrium
emerges, in which the incumbent does not share the AC-market. If the fixed cost
F is sufficiently large, then it is natural to assume that the entrant makes losses
in an isolating equilibrium: if the entrant only services the local market AB then
it will not be able to make positive profits. Therefore, in the following, we shall
concentrate on the accommodating equilibrium.
5.3.7 The strategic advantage of the incumbent created by the comple-
mentarities of services on the network
We consider now the exit decision by the incumbent and the entry decision by the
potential competitor.
From the previous analysis, it appears that if the incumbent withdraws its service
from the AB-market, then this has the following consequences
• First, it enables the incumbent to save on the part of the fixed cost which is
retrievable, (1− γ)F .
• Second, since it withdraws from that market, it looses any potential profits
that it could have earned if it were staying and competing with the entrant on
that market. However, since we assumed that competition is a` la Bertrand,
there is no differentiation between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s services
on the AB-market, and the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, even
if the incumbent stays on the AB-market it will not make any positive profits
on that market.
• Third, this leads the entrant to increase its price in the connecting AC-market
which is shared with the incumbent. This has a negative impact on the in-
cumbent’s profit since these services are demand complements.
Therefore, depending on parameters values, the incumbent might decide to with-
draw or not. If the fixed production cost (1 − γ)F is large, then it becomes more
interesting for the incumbent to withdraw from the market where entry occurred.
More importantly, if the size of the connecting market AC is sufficiently large, then
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the incumbent has no incentive to exit the local AB market since this would triggers
an increase in price of the entrant on the AC market.
Note that the logic is the opposite to the one developed in Section 5.2. There
we argued that a multiproducts incumbent, offering substitutable services from the
viewpoint of passengers, has an incentive to withdraw from the market where en-
try occurred since this leads to an increase in the demand of the market where the
incumbent remains present. In the current analysis, we already noticed that un-
der entry, the incumbent’s and the entrant’s services are complementary from the
viewpoint of passengers. Therefore, the incumbent has an incentive to stay active
on the market where entry occurred since the intense competition on the local mar-
ket will force the incumbent to reduce its price on the connecting market (which is
jointly serviced by both operators); this strategy has a positive spillover effect for
the incumbent on the connecting markets.
Now consider the entry decision by the potential competitor. Since the incum-
bent will decide to stay on the AB-market, if the competitor decides in turn to enter,
then its price peAC on the connecting AB-market will be capped by the marginal cost
of the incumbent. Given our assumption that the monopoly profit on the local AB-
market pim(ce) does not enable the entrant to cover the total fixed cost F , we assume
the price equilibrium that will realize ex post is a shared market equilibrium in which
the incumbent and the entrant service jointly the AC-market. Then, we obtain the
following conclusions:
• If the efficiency differential between the entrant and the incumbent is suf-
ficiently small, then the potential competitor decides not to enter the local
market. Indeed, in that case, the prices charged by the entrant cannot exceed
the marginal cost of the incumbent; therefore, since the entrant’s marginal
cost is above but close to the incumbent’s marginal cost, the entrant’s profit
will not enable to cover the fixed costs of production and entry.
• If the efficiency differential is sufficiently large, then the potential competitor
may decide to enter. Entry is possible only in this case.
5.3.8 Discussions
Consider a more complex network. What is needed for this analysis is the hub-spoke
feature of the network operated by the incumbent. If there are more than three cities
but still one single hub city, then the result presented above are reinforced, because
the complementarities created by the network effects are reinforced. Indeed, we
argued that by staying on the local market where entry occurred, the incumbent
triggers an intense price competition on that local market, which spreads out on
every connecting markets that the entrant may serve. Therefore, the larger is the
number of connecting markets from the hub city, the stronger will be the network
externalities and the stronger become incentives of the incumbent to stay on the
market where entry has occurred. This is represented in Figure 8.
This suggests that entry is likely to occur on the ‘rim’, which is possible and
profitable only if the direct traffic between the two non-hub cities is sufficiently
large.
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AB
C
Competition on the local
market implies lower price
on this market and lower
profits for the incumbent
and the entrant
Positive spillovers on
complementary markets
for the incumbent
Figure 8: Entry with competition in a local market creates spillover on
complementary markets served by the incumbent.
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